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NOTES
FEDERAL JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE
WELFARE PRACTICES
No group is more dependent upon public largesse than the recipients
of welfare payments. Indeed, the everyday actions of the governmental
bureaucracy are, for them, virtual conditions of survival. Despite the pre-
eminent role which administrative decisions play in the lives of these in-
dividuals, their interests have not, until recently, been given voice. However,
an emerging, militant leadership is revealing to the nation the lawlessness
which often characterizes the administration of welfare programs. A major
goal of this movement has been to secure federal judicial review of the various
types of decisions made in the administration of federally supported, state
welfare programs. The path to the federal courts is, however, strewn with a
number of potential obstructions. It is the purpose of this Note to examine the
various procedural obstacles confronting the welfare claimant and to reveal
the ways in which they may be overcome.
I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE WELFARE PROGRASS
Public welfare in the United States takes the forms of general assistance
and categorical assistance.' General assistance is financed by local and state
governments.2 Although programs of this sort provided the only public aid
available prior to the Depression, they now furnish only a small portion of
public welfare funds.3 Categorical assistance is today the predominant form
of public welfare. Under this scheme, state programs which are supported
by grants-in-aid from the federal governlment pursuant to the Social Security
Act administer aid to specific categories of needy individuals and families.
4
The federal statute recognizes four major categories: Old Age Assistance
(OAA), 5 Aid to the Blind (AB),6 Aid to the Permanently and Totally Dis-
abled (APTD)," and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
8
1. See 3. Wedemeyer & P. Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV.
326 (1966), for a detailed discussion of the structure of the American welfare system.
2. Id. at 333-34.
3. For a treatment of some problems in judicial review of general assistance sec
D. Mandelker, Judicial Review in General Assistance, 6 J. Pun. L. 100 (1957).
4. Social Security Act of 1935, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964), as amended (Supp. I,
1965).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1965).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1965).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1965). The original act had
no provisions for Aid to the Disabled. This provision was added in 1950. Social Security
Act Amendments of 1950, §§ 1401-05, 64 Stat. 555.
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1965). The provisions of this
section were substantially extended in 1961 to enable states to give aid to families where
the only reason for lack of parental support is the unemployment of the parent. 42 U.S.C.
§ 607 (1964).
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Each joint state-federal program provides aid for needy persons within the
statutory classification. AFDC, for example, authorizes federal support of
state assistance to needy children (and in certain circumstances to those who
care for them) when the children have been deprived of the care or support of
one or both parents through death, physical or mental incapacity, or continued
absence from the home.9
State participation is not required by the federal statute. States may
choose not to apply for federal assistance or may join in some, but not all,
of the programs.' In order to receive federal funds, however, state plans must
be submitted for the approval of the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare." Although the establishment of criteria for need and other factors
of eligibility is left largely to the states,' 2 the plans must meet certain basic
qualifications under the act13 and must conform to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Secretary.14 If at any time during the administration of a
state plan the Secretary finds that there has been substantial noncompliance
with the conditions imposed by statute or regulation, he "shall" cut off funds
from the state. 1 Such action may be taken only after the state has been af-
forded reasonable notice and an opportunity for a hearing to determine
whether the plan is in conformity with federal requirements. 16 From an ad-
verse decision, the state may seek judicial review in the federal circuit courts.'
7
The state plans themselves are usually devised pursuant to general en-
abling legislation empowering a state agency to promulgate rules and regula-
tions for administering the federal program.,8 Such legislation usually au-
9. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (Supp. I, 1965).
10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 1351 (1964). See also Carmichael v. Southern
Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 525-26 (1937) (title III of the original act providing for
federal aid to state unemployment compensation plans was not coercive in its effect on
the state).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301, 601, 1201, 1351 (1964).
12. See HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE SOCIAL SEcuRITY BILL, H.R.
REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, 24 (1935); SENATE Comm. ON FINANCE, THE
SOCIAL SEcUluTY BILL, S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 36, 52 (1935).
13. State plans for each of the four major programs must: (a) be in effect in all
subdivisions of the state; (b) provide for financial participation by the state; (c) estab-
lish or designate a single state agency for administration of the plan; (d) give oppor-
tunity for a fair hearing within a reasonable period of time to individuals whose claims
are either denied or not acted upon within a reasonable period of time; (e) provide for
such methods of administration as are found by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to be necessary for proper and efficient administration of the state plan; (f) pro-
vide for periodic reports as required by the Secretary; (g) provide for taking into
consideration all non-exempt income of claimants; (h) provide safeguards on disclosure
of information about applicants and recipients; (i) provide that all who wish to apply
may do so; (j) provide for descriptions of services available from the agency. In addi-
tion, other requirements peculiar to each of the various programs are set forth. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 302, 602, 1202, 1352 (Supp. I, 1965).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354 (1964).
16. 42 U.S.C. J§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354 (1964).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. I, 1965).
18. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 46:51 (1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 16.401 (1960);
N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §§ 18, 20; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2504 (Supp. 1965) ; S.C.
CODE ANN. § 71-9 (1962). Compare N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw which is very detailed in its
provisions with LA. REv. STAT. §§ 46:51-68 (1950).
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"thorizes the agency to create a plan for federal approval; indeed, some statutes
specifically charge the agency to do whatever is necessary to ensure continued
receipt of federal funds. 19 The procedures employed by the state agencies
generally contain certain basic elements. Thus, the federal act requires the
state to accord a "fair hearing" before the agency to persohs who are denied
assistance.20 And although few states provide explicitly for judicial review
of agency action,2 1 state court review is, in fact, usually afvailable-either
through the operation of a state administrative procedure act or by virtue of
general judicial or statutory principles controlling the review of administra-
tive actibn.
Apart from those procedures which are specifically set forth in the federal
statute, or represent the common response of the states to an ever present
problem, the state programs vary considerably with regard to'their standards
of eligibility and methods of administration. Most of these variations represent
legitimate exercises of the extensive discretion contemplated by Congress,
22
but some state welfare provisions may be violative of the United States Con-
stitution, the Social Security Act, or the binding regulations of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
A few illustrations of common state welfare regulations with potentially
illegal characteristics should suffice to indicate the nature of the issues which
welfare claimants might seek to litigate in federal court.23 The doubtful
legality of two provisions---"midnight searches" and "suitable home" policies2 4
19. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 99-2915 (Supp. 1966).
20. State statutes requiring fair hearings include LA. REv. STAT. § 46:107 (1950),
providing for appeal "in the manner and form prescribed by the state department....";
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 16.409 (1960), providing for "a fair hearing of appeals and com-
plaints, when requested in writing by any applicant for or recipient of assistance or
service, financed in whole or in part by federal funds."; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW
§§ 213(2), 293(1), (3), 304(4), 353(2) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 71-54, 71-55 (1962).
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2b (Supp. 1965) ("Such decision [of the
commissioner] after hearing shall be final except that the applicant for such hearing, if
aggrieved, may appeal therefrom . . . to the ,circuit court in any circuit in the county
wherein he resides .... ") ; CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 10962 (". . . the applicant
or.recipientor the affected county ... may file a petition with the superior court .... ").
But see GA. CODE ANN. § 99-2911 (Supp. 1965) ("The decision of the Director of the
Department of Family and Children Services on any appeal shall be final.") ; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 62, § 2507(e) (Supp. 1965) (providing that decisions on fair hearings, with
one limited exception, shall be "final." Of course, the. interpretation given to the word
"final" is crucial as to whether review will be granted for abuse of discretion or for a
decision not resting on substantial evidence.).
22. "Less Federal control is provided than in any recent Federal aid law." S. REt. No.
628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935).
23. For other substantive problems, see, e.g., B. Harvith, The Constitutionality of
Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 CALIF. L. REv.
567 (1966) ; R. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings
Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966) ; C. Reich, Indizidual Rights and Social Welfare:
The Einerqing Legal Issues, 74 YALE. L.J. 1245 (1965) ; E. Sparer, Social Welfare Law
Testing, 12 PRAc. LAW. 13 (1966).
24. On midnight searches, see C. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social
[Vol. 67:84,
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-has been noted by some authors, although neither of these techniques has
been the subject of direct attack in the courts.2 5 State practices denyingaid to
needy children who live in "'unsuitable homes" have been substantially cur-
tailed both by HEW regulation and by congressional enactment. 26 And HEW
has also recognized that midnight searches may often infringe upon the welfare
recipient's fourth amendment rights; administrative rulings to guard against
such abuses have been promulgated, and will soon go into effect.2 Neverthe-
less, prior to these recent statutory and regulatory changes, both practices
had continued unhampered and generally unnoticed for many years. 28 .
Other serious substantive problems have received even less attention.
For example, approximately one-third of all states fix the maximum amount
of grants to families with dependent children.29 A typical regulation reads:
The maximum grants in AFDC are $36 for the first child, $27 for
each additional child, $27 for a caretaker, and $27 for a second parent,
up to and not to exceed $144 per family per month.30
Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963). On suitable home policies see Note, Suitable
Home Tests Under Social Security: A Functional Approach to Equal Protection, 70
YALE L.J. 1192 (1961). See also W. BELL, Am To DEPENDENT CHI.azN (1965). The
midnight search issue arises through operation of one of the many variations of the "man
in the house" rule. The welfare claimant signs a blanket agreement to cooperate with the
agency. Subsequently, agency investigators or social workers come late at night or very
early in the morning and either ask or demand entry to determine whether any illicit
relationship which might cause aid to be denied is going on. Implicit, or often explicit,
is the threat that aid will be cut off if the recipient does not "cooperate" by consenting to
the search. Suitable home policies prior to 1962 consisted of determining that a certain
factor, or factors, would in itself render a home unsuitable. Thus, Louisiana determined
that homes with illegitimate children were "unsuitable" and terminated aid primarily on
that basis. W. BELL, supra at 137-38.
25. The midnight search question has, however, been raised as a central issue in
Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 51 Cal. Rptr. 589 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966). A social worker
has sued to regain his job after having been fired for refusing to participate in midnight
"bed checks." The California Court of Appeals held that such searches when, as in this
case, warning was given that it was not necessary to admit the searchers, did not violate
the fourth amendment. Therefore, dismissal for not obeying instructions was justified.
26. The suitable home policy as applied in Louisiana was the subject of a* major crisis
in 1960 and 1961. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Arthur Flemming,
promulgated a ruling on Jan. 17, 1961, effective July 1, 1961, prohibiting state plans from
imposing suitable home policies as a basis for denial of assistance without making adequate
provisions for the care of all children whose families were denied aid on this basis. W.
BELL, supra note 24, at 146-48. The substance of the Flemming ruling was incorporated
into the federal statute by 42 U.S.C. § 604(b) (1964).
27. A new regulation, effective July 1, 1967, may have the effect of outlawing mid-
night searches. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK
OF PuBLIc ASSISTANcE ADMINISTRATION, Part IV, Handbook Transmittal No. 77 (March
18, 1966) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL HANDBOOK]. Section 2230 of the transmittal
provides that states must guard against entering homes by force or without permission
or under false pretenses, or at times outside of normal working hours, especially during
sleeping hours. Because of the peculiar nature of the HEW Handbook of Public Assis-
tance, it is difficult to tell which provisions are to be interpreted as mandates aid which
as recommendations. Since states are required to show evidence of compliance with this
transmittal by submitting changes in state plans for approval by April 1, 1967, it is
likely that at least some of the language in the regulation will be held binding.
28. For a history of the extensive use to which suitable home policies were put,
especially in the South, to exclude large numbers of persons prior to the Louisiana crisis,
see W. BELL, supra note 24, at 93-110.
29. E. Sparer, supra note 23, at 21.
30. GA. MANUAL OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE, Part III, § VII, at G-37 (1966) [herein-
after cited as GA. MANUAL].
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A similar rule was held by the Iowa Supreme Court in Collins v. State Board
of Social Welfare3 1 to violate the equal protection clause of the Iowa Constitu-
tion. The court's holding that the regulation gave rise to an unreasonable
classification between children of large and small families 2 would seem to
apply with equal force under the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution.
Several state welfare plans include "substitute father" rules. These pro-
visions purport to be refinements of the federal statutory definition of "de-
pendent child." The Social Security Act defines "dependent child" as a needy
child "who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the
death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of
a parent . . . ."3 An example of a substitute father rule, though somewhat
harsher than other such rules, is furnished by the following Arkansas regula-
tion:
When a step-parent resides in the home, or when a parent maintains
a stable non-legal union, "continued absence of a parent from the
home" can no longer be considered as reason for deprivation. A stable
won-legal union is presumed, even though a father is not living con-
tinuously in the home, where the mother affords the privileges of a
husband to a man and there is a continuing relationship.
3 4
It is arguable that the Arkansas rule has redefined the word "parent" to
frustrate the purpose of the Social Security Act. The regulation denies aid
to children who have in fact been deprived of parental support within the
ordinary and accepted meaning of the word "parent." It does so, moreover,
wholly by reference to the mother's social or sexual relations and without
regard to the man's actual support of the children or the existence of any
legal obligation on his part to provide such support. 35
Still another potentially illegal regulation is the "employable mother"
rule. A Georgia regulation, for example, requires an able-bodied mother who
is not needed in the home to work if suitable employment is available110
Suitable employment is defined as work consonant with her training and
experience, within reasonable proximity to her home, and "in keeping with
the prevailing wage scale and working conditions existing in the community."3 17
A woman is "not needed in the home" when she can arrange to have her chil-
31. 248 Iowa 369, 81 N.W.2d 4 (1957).
32. Id. at 377, 81 N.W.2d at 9.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1964).
34. ARK. DEP'T OF PUBLIC WELFARE MANUAL 2813, at 1 (1966) (emphasis in origi-
nal) [hereinafter cited as ARK. MANUAL].
35. Since the legislative history of the Social Security Act is unambiguous in stating
that states could impose eligibility criteria on "moral" grounds, the argument presented
here is hardly dispositive. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935) ; H.R. RIP.
No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1935). Nevertheless, in light of the statutory adoption
of the Flemming ruling (see note 26 supra) it may be argued that if the state is to use
such criteria, alternative provisions for the children so deprived of aid are necessary.
36. GA. MANUAL, Part III, § V, at 8(2).
37. Id.
(Vol. 67:84
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dren cared for in her absence, when there is no child under three years of age,
and when her presence is not required because of serious illness.3 8 The Georgia
regulation is particularly harsh in that the mother's wages derived from full
time employment, no matter how small, are exclusive; they will not ordinarily
be supplemented by welfare payments.3 9 Thus, a woman earning $15 to $20 per
week would not be entitled to any aid for her dependent children even though
a needy family with four or more children would, by Georgia welfare budget
standards, normally be entitled to $144 per month.
The validity of the Georgia regulation is subject to both constitutional and
statutory objections. It may be argued that in defining suitable work by refer-
ence to community standards the provision invidiously discriminates against
Negroes, contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In many areas of the South, community mores sharply distinguish the work
which is proper and suitable for whites from that which will do for Negroes.
40
Furthermore, in withholding support from dependent children who otherwise
qualify as needy under state standards merely because their mothers secure
full time employment, the state has created a classification which does not
appear to bear any reasonable relationship to the purposes of the statute and
the program in general.41 The general prohibitions of the equal protection
clause are not the sole source of federal standards for invalidating the employ-
able mother rule. The legislative history of the Social Security Act clearly
reveals that Congress wished the employable mother to retain the right to
spend her time with her children rather than at work when the support of
the father was not available.42 In addition, the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare's Handbook of Public Assistance Administration contains
provisions which-while not phrased in mandatory terms-state that the
purpose of AFDC is to allow a mother to choose between working and being
with her family.
43
Improper administration of an otherwise valid state plan may raise issues
under the federal constitution or Social Security Act. Illegal practices may
exist even where the state statute and regulations are, on their face, unexcep-
tionable. The most common example is racial discrimination on the part of
local administrators. 44 Such a practice-even if specifically proscribed by the
state plan-would constitute a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
38. Id.
39. Id. at 9(3). The Georgia regulation is unusual in that the no-supplementation rule
is not often found in conjunction with employable mother rules in other states.
40. See, e.g., the Albany [Ga.] Herald which has classified advertisements which
overtly distinguish between positions available to whites and those available to Negroes.
Albany (Ga.) Herald, Jan. 5, 1967, at 1D, col. 5; id., Jan. 3, 1967, at 7, col. 5.
41. See Brief for Plaintiff, Anderson v. Schaeffer, Civil No. 10443 (N.D. Ga., filed
Sept. 20, 1966), for a complete exposition of the arguments against the rule.
42. See S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1935).
43. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 3401.
44. The Georgia employable mother rule, GA. MANUAL, Part III, § V, at 8(2),
provides ample opportunity for racial discrimination by local officials.
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1964 which prohibits the use of federal money in a discriminatory manner. 45
Local discrimination would also contravene the sections of the Social Security
Act calling for uniform implementation of a state plan within all political
subdivisions of the state.46 Occasionally, a local welfare board on its own
initiative adopts a very restrictive policy. Fearing federal intervention, the
state agency will usually act to remedy such aberrations.47 If it fails to main-
tain the standards of its own plan, however, its inaction will lead to an
infraction of the provision of the federal statute requiring uniform application.
III. AGENCIES AND CLAIMANTS: THE MOTIVES FOR SEEKING
FEDERAL JUDICIAL REvIEW
In the thirty-one year history of categorical assistance there have been
few attempts by dissatisfied claimants to secure judicial review of the validity
of state provisions.48 Because of the intimidating nature of the welfare struc-
ture, the general unavailability of legal assistance, and the indigency-and
often illiteracy--of the claimant, available remedies have not been utilized to
their fullest extent. However, it is likely that the courts will soon face a
significant increase in litigation in this area. Organizations of welfare recipients
and claimants are being generated at an accelerating pace in virtually every
large city in the country. Some of these groups are the products of indigenous
community leadership; others have been formed by student activist groups
or through community action programs under private or governmental
auspices.4 9 It is becoming apparent that these community organizations will
soon undertake large scale efforts to challenge the most glaring abuses through
the courts-in particular, the federal courts-as well as by direct action and
political persuasion.r° In order to appreciate why these groups prefer a federal
judicial forum for the resolution of the issues raised by the administration of
welfare programs, some understanding is necessary of the rules and procedures
of the various administrative agencies which are involved in the process.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 302(a) (1), 602 (a) (1), 1202(a) (1), 1352 (a) (1) (1964).
47. See State Bd. of Social Welfare v. City of Newburgh, 28 Misc. 2d 539, 220
N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
48. J. Yasui, Fair Hearings in Public Assistance 90-91 (1966) (unpublished thesis
in Graduate Dep't of Social Work and Social Research of Bryn Mawr College).
49. The organization of welfare recipients' groups can be considered to have started
with the Welfare Rights Organization (WRO) in Oakland, Cal. However, many local
civil rights movements in the South have been encouraging such organization for several
years. At present, groups of various size and strength exist in Chicago, Cleveland, New
York, Newark, Oakland, Albany (Ga.), Atlanta, and Washington, D.C., as well as in
other cities.
50. Several cases are already at various stages in the judicial process. E.g., Smith v.
Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1966); Anderson v. Schaeffer, Civil No.
10443 (N.D. Ga., filed Sept. 20, 1966) (challenge to the Georgia employable mother
rule); Smith v. King, Civil No. 2495-N (M.D. Ala., filed Dec. 2, 1966) (challenge to
Alabama substitute father rule).
[Vol. 67:84
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A. Inadequacy of the Federal Administrative Forunm
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has been extremely
reluctant to apply the drastic sanction of cutting off federal funds where state
plans may be operating inconsistently with federal law.51 In thirty years of
administration of the Social Security Act by the Department and its predeces-
sors, only sixteen conformity hearings have been ordered. 52 The Department
prefers whenever possible to settle its differences with the states through
negotiation. 53 Indeed, it has been reluctant to cut off funds even when there
has been wholesale exclusion of large classes of persons from welfare lists,
preferring instead to clarify federal requirements through the promulgation
of regulations prospective in effect.54 While such a policy avoids disrupting
the limited assistance still available to some people even in the most flagrant
cases of abuse, it does little to ensure efficient application of the mechanisms
intended to safeguard the interests of persons who have been excluded. More-
over, even in those cases in which HEW action has been effective in curbing
certain questionable state practices, relief has come only after long delay. The
Department's efforts to mitigate the suitable home and midnight search policies,
for example, were instigated only after those practices had received extensive
critical publicity.
The most serious inadequacy of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare as a guarantor of the protections afforded by federal law is the
absence of a formal means by which the dissatisfied individual can bring his
claim before the federal agency. The Social Security Act and the HEW regula-
tions do not provide procedures for the filing of complaints or appeals with
the Department. The only formal effort by individuals to force action by the
Department has failed. An application by Georgia and Arkansas claimants for
a conformity hearing to determine the legality of the Georgia and Arkansas
substitute father rules was submitted to the Department in 1966. No action
or response from the agency has yet been received.5 5 Although no statute
authorizes the Department to act as a general review board for state ad-
ministrative decisions concerning the alleged invalidity of a welfare provision,
nothing in the act would prevent the federal agency from adopting a procedure
51. See J. Wedemeyer & P. Moore, mtpra note 1, at 342; W. BELL, supra note 24,
at 223 n.33.
52. W. BELL, mpra note 24, at 223 n.33.
53. "In practice, hearings have been extremely rare. They are not held until after
reasonable effort has been made by regional and central office representatives to resolve
the questions involved by conference and discussion with State officials." FEDERAL
HANDBOOK, Part I, § 4300.
54. See W. BELL, supra note 24, at 137-51.
55. See Complaint and Petition for a Hearing Pursuant to § 404 of the Social Se-
curity Act, Johnson v. Department of Pub. Welfare (HEW, filed Feb. 1966). Conversa-
tions with Attorney C. B. King, counsel for the Georgia complainant, indicate that no
response has been received from the Department as yet.
1967]
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whereby claims of nonconformity would be processed and decided. While
complete appellate review of state fair hearing determinations would be un-
desirable and might exceed the Department's authority, there is no barrier to
the use of dissatisfied claimants as one of many sources of information as to the
conformity of state plans.
B. The Need for Judicial Review of State Welfare Programs
The benefits which attach to judicial review of administrative action in
general-preservation of the rule of law, prevention of arbitrariness, and as-
surance of ultimate recourse to a completely disinterested decision-making
body-apply as well to the review of state welfare administration. In addition
to these considerations, however, the peculiar nature of the welfare agencies,
and of the plight of the claimants, magnifies the need for ensuring the avail-
ability of a judicial forum to test the legality of certain aspects of state welfare
plans.
The "fair hearing" procedures of some states are entirely unsatisfactory
as final adjudicatory proceedings, for they do not permit challenges to the
validity of regulations which are of general applicability. Thus, two state
agencies-apparently the only ones to consider the question-have held that
they have no power to decide upon the legality of such provisions. 0 In juris-
dictions where this rule prevails, the claimant who does not dispute the ap-
plicability of the regulation to him, but only claims that it is illegal, can obtain
no relief at the fair hearing.
Even if the agency does not disqualify itself from considering the validity
of welfare regulations, there remain several barriers to obtaining an effective
adjudication on the merits. The persons responsible for the final decision in a
fair hearing are generally the persons who have promulgated the regulations
under attack. 57 Moreover, the hearings are informal proceedings and certain
types of relief which would be appropriate for implementing an adjudication
on the legality of the regulation-injunctions and declaratory judgments, for
example-are not available from the agency. These and other factors permit
an agency which is motivated by bad faith or considerations of expediency 8
to dispose of a case on some frivolous or non-existent factual ground, thus
avoiding a decision upon the validity of the regulation.
Another significant obstacle to obtaining an agency determination of the
56. See Memorandum of Decision, Request of Miss Dorothy Reed, Case No.
92-C-74675 (August 22, 1966), Conn. State Welfare Dep't; Decision in Regard to Appeal
for Fair Hearing in the Case of Mrs. Ovelia Robinson, Newark, N.J., Case No. EC-9475
(April 4, 1966).
57. E.g., LA. RFv. STAT. §§ 46:52, 46:107 (1950); N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §§ 18, 20,
213(2), 293(1), (3), 304(4), 353(2) ; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 71-9, 71-54, 71-55 (1962).
58. Many state welfare departments, like other state administrative agencies, are badly
understaffed.
[Vol. 67:84
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legality of its regulations is that welfare claimants are generally not repre-
sented by counsel. Although the right to retain counsel is secured by federal
regulations,59 and federal subsidies are available to states that wish to provide
free legal services for those on welfare,6° few states do, in fact, provide such
services. In the absence of state legal services, the assistance of counsel can
rarely be obtained. Few claimants have the means to retain an attorney in-
dependently, and only a small minority have been able to rely upon govern-
ment programs for legal aid or upon private individuals and organizations
which are specifically involved in civil rights and civil liberties matters.
61
Without a lawyer the lone claimant in a fair hearing will seldom know that the
rule by which he was excluded is illegal, much less know how to go about
challenging it.
The position of a claimant whose aid has been cut off or reduced is par-
ticularly precarious. Every day without the necessities of life creates an im-
mediate and irreparable injury. And the initial cutting off of funds usually has
permanent effect. HEW regulations do not require state agencies to restore
payments that have been withheld even if it is determined at the fair hearing
that the denial of aid was erroneous, 6 2 and most states do not provide such
reimbursement. 63 Challenges to state welfare regulations are particularly un-
likely when the questionable provision takes the form of a condition upon the
receipt of aid-such as blanket cooperation clauses which agencies interpret
to permit midnight searches-rather than the denial of aid to certain classes.
The state is not required to provide a fair hearing when it imposes the condi-
tion,6 4 but only later, when aid has been reduced or cut off. Those who are
receiving aid under such conditions are likely to submit to the restrictions,
for a refusal to obey entails a prolonged confrontation with the agency during
which the individual would have no means of support. In such circumstances,
direct access to the courts would permit testing such provisions.
Another inadequacy of the administrative scheme is evident in comparison
with judicial procedures. State welfare agencies do not provide a "class ac-
tion" on the part of claimants wishing to challenge the validity of regulations.
Yet, such an action would be the most efficient means for these economically
59. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6200(3) (e).
60. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6400(2) (b).
61. The NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund does reimburse cooperating
attorneys for some work done for welfare claimants. The Columbia School of Social
Work in cooperation with the Office of Economic Opportunity has recently established a
center for social welfare law research which involves testing various welfare provisions.
Individual attorneys and some neighborhood law programs established by OEO have
shown progressively more interest in this area.
62. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, §§ 5413.2, 5422.
63. See, e.g., GA. MANUAL, Part III, § VIII, at 1.
64. The statute provides for hearings if aid is denied or if decision is not made
promptly. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (4) (1964) ; 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4), 1352 (a)-
(4) (Supp. I, 1965).
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dependent individuals to assert their collective grievances. The federal courts,
by contrast, have accommodated their procedures -in recognition of the fact
that certain citizens are less able to protect their rights than others. Thus, in
an analogous situation, the federal courts have allowed the class action to
vindicate the rights of Negroes in school desegregation cases.65 A similar use
of the class action would be a powerful weapon in testing the legality of state
welfare regulations.
In some areas of the country the same factors which work to discourage
minority groups generally from asserting their rights operate upon the welfare
client as well. A disproportionately large percentage of welfare recipients
are Negroes. 66 Where discrimination is widespread, the client faces a
predominantly white power structure within the agency which administers a
program structured by a predominantly white legislature and supervised,
if at all, by an all white judiciary. The likelihood that a Negro mother of
several illegitimate children will, through such procedures, successfully chal-
lenge a regulation which may have been created precisely for the purpose of
excluding her is not great. Even where discrimination and oppression is not
overt, the bureaucratic system operates to discourage and intimidate many.07
It is not surprising, then, that fair hearings have rarely been used as a forum
fo2 attacking the validity of state welfare regulations. 8
These difficulties are compounded by the most fundamental inadequacy
of the state fair hearing procedure-that it generates no uniform and binding
body of law delineating the permissible scope of administrative discretion.
While federal regulations require that the claimant be afforded a record of the
hearing,6 9 decisions are generally not published; thus, even assuming a fair
and competent ad hoc adjudicative process, there is no assurance of consistent
adherence to well-known principles or rules of decision. Moreover, regulations
in both state and federal handbooks are not generally available to the public.
Although the agency will provide a lawyer or claimant access to the particular
regulations which the agency considers relevant to the case, the rules govern-
ing the general area involved are not made available, and meaningful legal
research or argument is seriously hampered as a result.
65. E.g., Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 921 (1957).
66. L. Miller, Race and Poverty, 54 CALIF. L. Rav. 386, 397 (1966).
67. See S. Briar, Welfare Fron Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare
System, 54 CALiF. L. Rav. 370 (1966). See especially the section on recipients' views of
agency decision making. Id. at 377. In the author's sample 60% of the recipients reported
that they had not been informed of their right to appeal. Id. at 379. The findings of this
survey may not reflect the actual number of persons, who were told of their right to an
appeal, for it must be recognized that the act of informing a client of this right often takes
the form of reading aloud a long, legalistic document which; somewhere, speaks of a
right to appeal. Seldom is the substance of the application form, ultimately signed or
marked by the applicant, explained in plain English (or Spanish).
68. J. Yasui, supra note 48.
69. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6338.
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C. The Advantages of Federal Judicial Review
Judicial review would obviate many of the difficulties which stem from
the absence, in the state administrative structure, of both stare decisis and an
effective means for challenging regulations. Some of the needs for judicial re-
view may be fulfilled by proceedings in state courts. However, review in the
courts of some states is precluded by state law. And even where it is not, wel-
fare claimants are nevertheless likely to prefer resolution of important con-
stitutional and statutory issues by the federal judiciary.
One reason for this preference is that state courts in some parts of the
country may fail to extend effective protection to the interests of Negro plain-
tiffs. Civil rights and civil liberties lawyers operating in the South befieve that
the federal judiciary there is, on the whole, more inclined to recognize and
protect a Negro's interests than are certain state courts.70 Thus, to avoid pos-
sible racial discrimination, the welfare claimant would seek review in federal
court.
Moreover, the legal questions which are presented by welfare cases are,
for the most part, federal. The central issue is usually whether a state statute,
regulation, or administrative practice violates the United States Constitution,
the Social Security Act, or the HEW regulations. Even when a state court is
asked to decide whether an agency regulation violates the state statute, the
answer will often turn upon an interpretation of federal law. 71 Not only are
federal courts likely to be more familiar with the questions presented than are
the state courts, but federal interpretation will lead to a more uniform applica-
tion of the Social Security Act throughout the nation. While the structure of
the act and its legislative history reflect a desire to permit many types of varia-
tions among the states,72 they also set forth certain minimum criteria to which
all state plans must conform.73 Uniform adherence to these standards is easier
to achieve through federal circuit court decisions; such rulings will control
the adjudication of similar issues arising in federal courts construing the law
of other states within the same circuit. They would also be more likely to be
persuasive to federal courts in other areas than would state decisions .on the
same questions.
The relationship between the federal courts and the Department of Health,*
Education, and Welfare is far different from that between the state courts and
the Department. Only the federal courts can compel remedial action on the
70. See, e.g., A. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court
Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965).
71. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont. 447, 92 P.2d 273 (1939)
(holding that Montana statute incorporated, by implication, the requirements of the Social
Security Act as binding upon the state agency).
72. H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18, 24 (1935); S. REP. No. 628,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935).
73. Id.
1967]
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part of HEW when such relief is sought. Moreover, federal court decisions
are likely to have significant influence upon the Department even when it is
not made a party to the action. A state court holding that a regulation was
invalid under the federal constitution would be unlikely to influence HEW
to the same extent as the same determination by a federal court, particularly
if the unconstitutionality were not patently clear.
The methods by which state welfare programs may be challenged in
federal court will vary with the nature of the illegality asserted and the relief
requested. Suits to enjoin the enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
state practice or regulation can be brought directly against the state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Secondly, the same relief can be sought under section
1983 on a claim that the state regulation violates the Social Security Act or
HEW regulations. Finally, suit may be brought in the federal court against
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to compel him to determine
whether the state plan complies with mandatory federal requirements and to
cut off funds if he finds non-conformity.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE WELFARE PRACTICES
If a substantial constitutional attack can be mounted against a state wel-
fare regulation or administrative practice, the injured welfare claimant can
bring an action against the responsible state officials under section 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
74
If it could be proved, for example, that an "employable mother" rule was
intended to, and did in fact, discriminate against Negro claimants in violation
of the fourteenth amendment,75 an injunction could be obtained restraining
further enforcement of the unconstitutional regulation30 Jurisdiction of the
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
75. See note 40 supra and accompanying text. While § 1983 has at times been
restrictively interpreted to exclude equal protection cases, see Bottone v. Lindsley, 170
F.2d 705 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949), recent decisions have
probably abandoned such restrictions. The reapportionment cases and school desegregation
cases, as well as brutality cases, are now brought under this section. See, e.g., McNeese v.
Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) ; Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Racial discrimination would also constitute a clear violation
of title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to -4 (1964).
76. Damages and, in some cases, punitive damages are available as a remedy under
§ 1983. Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965). Nevertheless, as a practical matter,
asking such relief would, in most welfare cases, be inadvisable. The primary objective is to
remove the operation of an illegal regulation. Only an injunction or declaratory judgment
will directly accomplish this purpose. Courts may be reluctant to assess damages against
one who was carrying out a regulation formulated by his superiors.
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federal district court over such a cause of action would clearly exist under
section 1343(3) of the Judicial Code,77 and there would be no need to estab-
lish that the amount in controversy exceeded $10,000.78
There are only two potential obstacles to effective vindication of con-
stitutional claims in the federal courts. Under the judicially developed doc-
trine of abstention, a federal court could refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
in order to allow the state courts to resolve issues of state law which might
render a determination of the constitutional issues unnecessary. In addition,
the welfare claimant may be obliged to exhaust certain administrative remedies
before state or federal agencies. Finally, if these two barriers are overcome,
there remains the further question whether a three-judge district court may
be obtained in such cases.
A. The Doctrine of Abstention
A rule requiring a federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction
in order to allow a state court to interpret the challenged law in a manner
which avoids constitutional difficulties would preclude effective federal judicial
review. Claimants who did not receive outside aid could rarely afford the delay
until the state court had acted and the constitutional issue reached the Supreme
Court from the state courts or became ripe for adjudication in the district
court. An even more undesirable consequence of abstention, however, is that
the state court would probably construe the regulation to avoid constitutional
objections by holding it either inapplicable to the plaintiff or unauthorized by
the state statute; if so, a federal determination of the constitutional issue would
not take place, and the effectiveness of the suit as a test case for the benefit of
all welfare claimants would be destroyed.
1 9
The doctrine of abstention is founded upon the general policy of avoid-
ing unnecessary constitutional determinations.8 0 As outlined by the Supreme
Court in Railroad Commission v. Pullman8 and Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,"2
the doctrine provides that a federal court should decline to exercise its juris-
diction if three factors are presented in a case. First, the precise meaning of
77. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
78. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
79. It is, of course, not unheard of for an administrator to seek to avoid, in any way
possible, an adjudication of possibly illegal action. See Note, Mootness and Ripeness:
The Postman Always Rings Twice, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 867 (1965).
80. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
81. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
82. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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the state law and its application to the facts in question must be unclear so
that the state court could reasonably interpret the act to obviate constitutional
issues. Second, since abstention seeks to avoid friction with state courts and
interference with legitimate state interests, the subject matter of the litigation
should involve substantial questions of state public policy. Finally, the federal
court must be satisfied that the state judicial remedy is adequate to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff and to protect his constitutional claim. Sub-
sequent decisions applying the doctrine failed to adhere strictly to each of
these prerequisites. In several cases abstention was held appropriate even
though the application of state law was unambiguous; the courts stressed that
no state court had yet construed the statute and that the federal right would
be fully protected pending the state action.83 However, even this latter factor
has at times been ignored.84
Abstention has been rigidly applied in some suits brought under section
1983. Thus, in Harrison v. NAACP8 5 the Supreme Court held that the district
court should have refrained from considering the constitutionality of several
Virginia statutes prohibiting solicitation of litigation concerning racial integra-
tion. Although the district court bad found clear first and fourteenth amend-
ment violations, 6 the Supreme Court ruled that abstention was necessary
since the Virginia courts, if afforded an opportunity to pass on the question,
might construe away the constitutional defects. The Court emphasized that
the district court could safeguard the plaintiffs' constitutional rights by restrain-
ing enforcement of the statutes during the litigation in the state courts."s
Three dissenting justices in Harrison argued that a suit brought under
section 1983 is never an appropriate vehicle for abstention. 8 While the
Supreme Court has yet to lay down such an explicit broad pronouncement,
recent decisions have seriously undermined the applicability of the doctrine
to cases asserting deprivation of the personal rights and liberties protected
by section 1983. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that abstention is "not
an automatic rule applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful
issue of state law; it rather involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity
powers."89 Moreover, the Court has made it clear that a federal court should
not decline to exercise its jurisdiction merely because the plaintiff could ob-
tain adequate redress under state law-that the doctrine does not require
83. See Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
84. See Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. dctied,
370 U.S. 925 (1962).
85. 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
86. NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 528-29 (D. Va. 1958).
87. 360 U.S. at 179
88. Id. at 179-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
89. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964). See also Harman v. Forsseiiius,
380 U.S. 528, 534-37 (1965).
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exhaustion of all state remedies. 0 There must be "strands of local law woven
into the case,"'91 and they cannot be subsidiary issues or questions of negligible
interest to the state. Indeed, in one recent decision in which abstention was
held improper, the Supreme Court emphasized that the federal determination,
though involving, aspects of state law, would not "work a disruption of an
entire legislative scheme of regulation.1
92
The Court has also stressed as a prerequisite to abstention that the mean-
ing and application of state law be truly unclear and susceptible to legitimate
'construction which would save it from constitutional objection. The mere
absence of a prior interpretation by the state courts is no longer sufficient.
3
Nor need the state statute or regulation appear unconstitutional on its face;
the federal court can itself determine that the effect as applied is a deprivation
of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.0 4 Indeed, the Court has suggested that
generally the type of ambiguity which will support a decision to abstain is
uncertainty as to whether the state rule applies to the complaining party, not
a mere lack of clarity as to its precise meaning.95 Finally, when the state law
is attacked on grounds of vagueness, abstention has been held inappropriate
since this constitutional defect cannot be cured by any single state court inter-
pretation.9 6
Another aspect of the trend away from strict application of the abstention
doctrine has been the Court's growing reluctance to assume that adequate pro-
tection will be provided against irreparable injury which may result from the
purported violation of the litigant's constitutional rights pending the state
court proceedings. Indeed, the threat to some fundamental rights has been
deemed so pernicious that sufficient interim protection is presumed impossible.
Thus, the Supreme Court has created a blanket exception from the abstention
rule for actions alleging deprivations of free speech,9 7 not only because of
the immediate harm to the plaintiffs, but primarily because of the widespread
"chilling" effect upon free. exercise of the right. 98 The dangers of delay and
90. See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) ; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S.
167 (1961); Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966); Powell v. Workmen's
Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 '(2d Cir. 1964). Language to this effect in the Monroe
decision has been read as destroying the doctrine as to "§' 1983 cases. See Comment, The
Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALiF. L. REv. 145, 169 (1961). That the plaintiff
need not seek redress in the state courts before bringing'suit under § 1983, however, does
not necessarily preclude abstention in order to avoid an unconstitutional construction of an
unclear state law.
91. McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 (1963).
92. Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
93. Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1965).
94. Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965) ; Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964).
95. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 376-77 (1964).
96. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965);- Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360, 378 (1964).
97. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483-92 (1965). See also Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965) (reluctance to abstain in voting rights cases) ; McNeese
v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963) (reluctance in school desegregation situations).
98. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
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the immediacy of the need for relief have thus become predominant factors
in the federal court's decision whether to abstain. In short, the Supreme
Court's consistent refusal since 1960 to require abstention in section 1983
cases suggests that the position of the dissenters in Harrison v. NAACP
may have carried the day.
Assuming that the abstention doctrine retains some vitality in section
1983 cases, its application to suits by welfare claimants would nevertheless
be inappropriate in most cases. In the first place, the meaning of a welfare
regulation is usually clear on its face, and the applicability of the challenged
rule to the plaintiff is not likely to be uncertain. If the regulation incorporates
an imprecise exclusionary standard which may be used arbitrarily or dis-
criminatorily-a "suitable home" policy perhaps-it might be attacked on
grounds of vagueness, again rendering abstention improper. Secondly, a
federal decision would not disrupt a regulatory scheme in which the state has
a substantial interest. The questions presented are generally federal; indeed,
many welfare decisions by state courts have been based primarily upon federal
rather than state substantive law. 9 There is little danger of conflicting state
and federal interpretations of state law, for state welfare programs-unlike
the statutory schemes considered in the Pullman and Burford decisions' 00-
involve no complex and purely local policies and are, for the most part, merely
statutory adoptions of the federal program. While the states are accorded wide
discretion in formulating such rules,' there will, nevertheless, be little reason
for the district court to stay its hand. The regulation's applicability to the plain-
tiffs will rarely be in question, and the only other probable route by which the
state court could avoid constitutional objections would be by invalidation under
the federal act or its equivalent-the state enabling statute which incorporates
the federal act.
The most compelling reason for the federal court to exercise its jurisdic-
tion over welfare suits under section 1983 is the immediate and irreparable
harm suffered by the plaintiff unconstitutionally cut off from aid. This injury
is not prevented pending litigation in the state courts, for the claimant cannot
seek review until his aid has been severed and back payments are not afforded
by most states.10 2 Thus, the two considerations which have persuaded the
Supreme Court not to require abstention in other areas-delay and immediacy
99. See, e.g., Pearson v. State Social Welfare Bd., 54 Cal. 2d 184, 353 P.2d 33, 5
Cal. Rptr. 553 (1960) (upholding a California regulation principally on ground that
federal law mandated the regulation); State ex rel. Dean v. Brandjord, 108 Mont.
447, 92 P.2d 273 (1939).
100. In Pullman, the State of Texas was held to have an interest in determining the
powers of its regulatory Commission since it was unclear to what extent the decision made
was within the jurisdiction of the administrative body. 312 U.S. at 499-500. In Burford
the Texas statutory scheme was a complex one dealing with the conservation of naturai
resources within the state. 319 U.S. at 318-19.
101. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 67:84
HeinOnline -- 67 Colum. L. Rev. 100 1967
REVIEW OF WELFARE PRACTICES
of the need for relief-are present in even greater measure in the case of the
welfare claimant.1 3 It is true that where welfare recipients bring section 1983
suits to challenge unconstitutional conditions which they have not yet violated
-to contest the validity of midnight search policies, for example-the plain-
tiffs suffer no concrete financial injury. But such conditions may be said to
create pressures on welfare claimants analogous to the "chilling effects" of
strictures upon first amendment rights. 10 4 While such potentially unconstitu-
tional conditions remain in force, the individual's fear of losing welfare support
stifles exercise of fourth amendment rights in the same way that the threat
of criminal sanctions or loss of employment dampens free speech. Federal
abstention would be equally improper in one case as it is in the other.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Must the claimant undergo a fair hearing before the state or local agency
prior to prosecuting a section 1983 action in the federal district court? Such
a requirement would have the same disadvantages for welfare claimants as a
decision by the federal court to abstain: the economic hardship of the delay
would impose a steep barrier to effective relief, and adjudication of the claim
by the agency would unnecessarily postpone federal judicial determination of
the ultimate constitutional issues. Nevertheless, the well-settled general rule
is that recourse to a federal court for review of an administrative decision-
by either a state or federal agency-is proper only after all available ad-
ministrative remedies have been exhausted. 10 5
For the adjudication of the usual claim of illegal exclusion from assistance,
103. It may be argued that the federal court, while abstaining from a consideration
of the merits, could, nevertheless, order that welfare payments be continued during the
state action. Some support for such a view can be gleaned from the Supreme Court's
observation in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 179 (1959), that the district court
could thus protect the plaintiffs by temporarily restraining enforcement of the allegedly
unconstitutional criminal statute. The analogy, however, is somewhat infirm, and the
court is unlikely to make such an order requiring the affirmative payment of state funds
which have been cut off or denied by a presumptively lawful administrative determination.
104. The pressures upon the welfare claimant to sacrifice his constitutional rights do
not constitute "chilling effects" within the precise meaning of the phrase as used by the
Supreme Court in Donbrowski. To date, the Court has applied the doctrine only in first
amendment cases because only there does the total harm to society from the regulation of
free expression exceed the sum of individual injuries to those oppressed. In other words,
the first amendment is deemed to serve societal values beyond the merely personal rights
to freedom-the entire political process depends upon it. To the extent that the doctrine is
founded upon that principle, its application is limited to the narrow confines of a situation
such as that in Dombrowski. Nevertheless, "chilling" is rooted in the problems of timing
of federal review of state imposed sanctions on the exercise of constitutional rights. Thus,
the doctrine is aimed at alleviating the damage to all individuals subject to sanctions caused
by their mere existence, which may deter the legitimate exercise of constitutional rights.
"The threat of sanctions may deter . . . almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). In this limited respect, welfare
regulations which are applied to threaten the loss of aid unless basic constitutional rights
are waived do impose a "chilling effect" similar to that of criminal statutes designed to
curb first amendment privileges.
105. See, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952); Myers
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938).
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the state agency theoretically provides an adequate remedy. All states are
required, both by statute and regulation, to hold some form of fair hearing
whenever aid has been denied, cut off, or reduced.0 6 By HEW regulation,
the fair hearing decisions must be binding upon both local and state agen-
cies..0 7 Moreover, most states prescribe that the hearing be held promptly
after an appeal is taken and that the decision be rendered soon after the
hearing.'08 Thus, in theory, a complete and expeditious remedy is available
for any allegation that loss of aid resulted from an erroneous factual deter-
mination of the administrator. As to most of the claims for which federar
judicial review would be sought, however, the fair hearing procedure is wholly
inadequate, and the plaintiff should be able to proceed directly to the district
court under section 1983.
1. Practical Non-existence of the Administrative Remedy. Of course,
if no administrative remedy exists the exhaustion doctrine is inapplicable. 100
Thus, the district court would not oblige the plaintiff initially to seek relief
from any federal agency, for the Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare has yet to provide any formal appellate procedure for dissatisfied individual
claimants. Similarly, there may be situations in which no state administrative
remedy is afforded. The clearest instance is that in which the welfare recipient
wishes to challenge an allegedly illegal condition upon his receipt of aid-
midnight searches, for example. He will probably be unwilling or unable to
risk the loss of livelihood by refusing to consent to such searches. However,
unless the recipient is taken off welfare as a result of the raid itself or because
of his refusal to consent, he cannot obtain any administrative relief under
most state plans ;110 a fair hearing need be held only when an order directly
affects the amount or existence of aid."'
Nor would the federal court require the recipient deliberately to exclude
himself from aid or to wait until he had been cut off in order to open the
channels to administrative review. Certainly if the police had conducted an
illegal search, the victim would have a right of action under section 1983
whether or not further official action had been taken against him as a result
of the findings of the search." 2 Indeed, the mere existence of such a practice
by the local police-or by welfare, agencies-might afford an aggrieved in-
dividual standing to seek an injunction against further conduct which could
106. 42 U.S.C. § 302(a) (4) (1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (4), 1202(a) (4), 1352(a)-
(4) (Supp. I, 1965); FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6200(3).
107. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6200(2).
108. The statutory provisions cited in note 106 supra, say nothing of a time limit for
hearings. The regulation in the Federal Handbook only provides that the hearing be
provided promptly. FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Part IV, § 6200 (3) (f). The recommended time
limit is 30 days. Many states comply with this, but some take 60 days.
109. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 634-35 (1941).
110. See, e.g., GA. MANUAL, Part III, § X, at 4(D). But see ARK. MANUAL 6220(7).
111. Federal statutes and regulations confine their attention to appeal from denials of
aid or failures to act upon applications. See note 106 supra.
112. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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affect his, or others', fourth amendment rights.11 Declaratory or injunctive
relief is not available from the welfare agencies, and they need not, therefore,
be petitioned for a remedy which they have no power to provide.
2. Futility of Pursuing the Administrative Renedy. It is generally held
that where pursuit of an administrative remedy would be futile, exhaustion is
not a prerequisite to federal judicial review.11 4 If the state welfare agency
would refuse in a fair hearing to rule upon the constitutional or statutory
validity of a challenged regulation, recourse to that procedure would clearly
be unavailing.
Consequently, in a jurisdiction in which the agency has already held itself
incompetent to consider the validity of its regulations, exhaustion clearly would
not constitute a condition of review under section 1983. Such a circumstance
would fall squarely within the rule laid down by the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Koepke v. Fontecchio:
The Housing Expediter had already announced his interpretation.
He later embodied it in a regulation, and he still insists upon it here.
In such circumstances an attempt to secure relief by resort to the so-
called administrative remedies would clearly have been futile and
equity does not require the doing of a useless thing.
1 1 5
This rule has been reiterated in section 1983 suits in which the previous ac-
tions or the announced policy of the administrative agency indicated that the
requested redress would be denied.11 6 In welfare cases, futility would probably
also exist if the agency had already upheld the regulation or had regularly
denied relief in nearly identical cases.
When there is no specific regulation or declaration of intent by the ad-
ministrative authority, futility may be more difficult to establish. It is true
that in the only discovered decisions on the question, state welfare depart-
ments have deemed themselves powerless to rule on the legality of their own
regulations in a fair hearing. l1 7 In each case it was held that such a deter-
113. See Langford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
114. See, e.g., Levers v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 219 (1945) ; United States v. Abilene &
So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924); L. JAFFE, JUDICrAL CONTROL OF ADMINISxTTIVE AcTIoN
446-49 (1965).
115. 177 F.2d 125, 128 (9th Cir. 1949). This statement was actually dictum in the
Koepke opinion. First, the "so-called" administrative remedy appears to have been an
action at law. Second, the court noted that the regulations embodying the agency's policy
had "no bearing upon the issue here presented and [that] the Act provides no administra-
tive remedy. . . ." Id. at 128. HEowever, though the decision is probably more accurately
described as holding that the remedy was non-existent rather than that its pursuit was
futile, the case is generally recognized as authority for the rule that exhaustion of a futile
remedy is not necessary. See, e.g., L. JAIn, supra note 114, at 449. See also Montana
Nat'l Bank v. Yellowstone County, 276 U.S. 499, 505 (1928) ; Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S.
606 (1918).
116. Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268
(5th Cir. 1957) ; School Bd. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 63-64 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 910 (1957).
117. In the only cases that have come to our attention which have raised, at the fair
hearing, the question of the invalidity of the regulation in a formal manner, the state
departments ruled that the question could not be decided in the administrative process,
1967]
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mination could properly be obtained only in a judicial forum. But a finding
of futility cannot rest on the assumption that all state agencies deem themselves
similarly powerless. Since HEW rules mandate a hearing procedure which
will be binding upon the state agency, most states have provided that the de-
cisions in fair hearings be made by the same persons who are authorized to
promulgate regulations." 81 Presumably, the power to create rules and regula-
tions includes a power to modify or abrogate them.
One means to establish futility is to demonstrate consistent bad faith on
the part of the agency."19 It is the impression of some lawyers familiar with
welfare litigation that some state agencies consistently attempt to avoid con-
fronting policy issues -*o "Individual adjustments" are frequently negotiated
with persons who seem determined to challenge a given policy. While good
faith avoidance of disrupting broad decisions may be wise in some cases, con-
scious efforts to evade general questions for the purpose of obstructing either
administrative or judicial invalidation of regulations constitute actions taken
in bad faith which should obviate the necessity for exhaustion. Such conduct
is especially inexcusable in welfare cases in view of the inability of most wl-
fare claimants to prosecute their individual grievances effectively. Particularly
when the agency's bad faith is motivated by racial discrimination, the federal
court should deem exhaustion futile and unnecessary.' 2 '
3. Section 1983 and Exhaustion. There is a growing body of judicial
authority to the effect that exhaustion of administrative remedies may never
be required for an action properly brought under section 1983. The genesis
of this development was Monroe v. Pape,'2 in which the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was not required to pursue his state judicial remedies for
an unlawful search before prosecuting a section 1983 action in the district
court. Two years later, in McNeese v. Board of Education, 23 the Court re-
iterated this notion in deciding that exhaustion of a state administrative remedy
was unnecessary. The plaintiffs, Negro children, had brought suit under sec-
tion 1983 to enjoin the alleged practice of segregation in an Illinois public
but would require an action in court. Memorandum of Decision, Request of Miss Dorothy
Reed, Case No. 92-C-74675 (Aug. 22, 1966), Conn. State Welfare Dep't, at 2: "Attorney
was advised a mandamus action was the proper procedure to contest the adequacy of
agency standards." See also Decision in Regard to Appeal for Fair Hearing in the Case
of Mrs. Ovelia Robinson, Newark, N.J., Case No. EC-9475 (April 4, 1966).
118. See note 57 supra.
119. Compare Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 840 (1959), and Carson v. Board of Educ., 227 F.2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955), and Davis
v. Am, 199 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1952), with Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131 (4th Cir. 1960).
120. "[New York] State department policy appears to be that of avoiding hearings
and rulings on policy issues whenever possible." Memorandum from Edward V. Sparer,
Director, Columbia School of Social Work, Legal Research Division, to Helmet Furth,
re "Federal requirements for welfare fair hearing procedure not observed in New York,"
at 7. Copy on file with the Columbia Law Review.
121. It should be pointed out that proving bad faith may, as a practical matter, be
very difficult.
122. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
123. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
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school. The district court dismissed the action because of their failure to avail
themselves of the procedure provided by the Illinois School Code whereby
complaints of segregation could be taken to the Superintendent of Schools
upon a petition signed by a certain number-not less than fifty-of the school
district's residents. In the course of its opinion reversing the dismissal, the
Supreme Court cited Monroe for the general proposition that "relief under
the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought
under state law which provided a remedy."' 24 This language on its face can
be read as completely dispensing with the exhaustion requirement in any
action under the Civil Rights Act. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals for both the
second and fourth circuits as well as a number of district courts have so
interpreted the McNeese decision.125 If this view prevails, the availability of
a state fair hearing will be no obstacle to the welfare claimant asserting a
federal constitutional right under section 1983.
Some courts, however, have construed McNeese more narrowly, 26 and
with good reason. The Supreme Court's opinion focused primarily upon the
inadequacy of the Illinois administrative remedy, emphasizing that the require-
ment of fifty signatures afforded little opportunity for the vindication of in-
dividual rights and that the Superintendent's remedial powers, even if he found
unlawful segregation, were insufficient to give prompt and effective relief.
1 27
Thus, the Court did not throw out the exhaustion doctrine altogether; rather
its precise holding was that "[w] hen federal rights are subject to such tenuous
protection, prior resort to a state proceeding is not necessary.'
128
Even if McNeese did not render exhaustion a dead issue in all cases, it
nevertheless did substantially mitigate the requirement for section 1983 cases.
Moreover, it indicated that the courts should closely scrutinize the adequacy of
the administrative relief. Under such rigorous standards a state fair hearing
procedure may be found insufficient unless it provides a clear remedy not only
for the denial of aid but also for other challenges to the validity of the welfare
regulations. It must be remembered, however, that the experience to date of
attacking regulations in fair hearings is very limited.' 29 To a large extent, the
evolution of the relaxed exhaustion requirement in the school desegregation
124. Id. at 671.
125. See, e.g., Rivers v. Royster, 360 F.2d 592 (4th Cir. 1966) ; Powell v. Workmen's
Compensation Bd., 327 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1964); Clarke v. Redeker, 259 F. Supp. 117
(S.D. Iowa 1966).
126. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
127. The Superintendent has the power only to inform the state attorney general of
the discriminatory practice. The attorney general must then bring suit to rectify the
situation. 373 U.S. at 670.
128. 373 U.S. at 676.
129. An effective challenge to the substance of a regulation at a fair hearing, of neces-
sity, would involve representation by competent counsel. Only recently has there been
anything even remotely resembling a systematic effort to provide legal services to the poor
for areas of civil law.
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cases was the result of nearly a decade of experience and judicial impatience
with a particular type of local agency.180 Certainly, it is to be hoped that the
states will evolve clear and expeditious administrative procedures for adjudi-
cating the validity of regulations as the challenges to presently constituted
welfare programs increase.' 31 If such remedies are developed, there will be
less compelling reason to excuse exhaustion before judicial review. However,
judicial tolerance and the presumption of good faith on the part of the agencies
need not endure for a decade if positive efforts to enlarge or clarify present
administrative remedies are not made. The condition of the welfare claimant-
uncontestably qualified on the basis of need but excluded by operation of an
illegal rule-is sufficiently precarious to warrant zealous federal enforcement
of often fundamental constitutional rights. The passage of time itself creates
injury great enough to warrant judicial scrutiny of the adequacy of available
administrative remedies-a scrutiny at least as close as that in the school
desegregation cases.
C. Hearings Before a Three-Judge District Court
Many welfare suits under section 1983 probably will have to be heard and
determined by statutory three-judge federal district courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2281, which provides that only such courts are empowered to restrain
enforcement of state laws on grounds of unconstitutionality. 182 For welfare
claimants the three-judge court is a particularly desirable and effective method
of judicial review, especially in the initial test cases. Direct appeal of the
decision of the statutory court to the Supreme Court is afforded by statute,133
-a more expeditious route to the top of the federal judiciary. Moreover, the
quality of the district court will often be improved,' 34 particularly in the South,
130. The decade of frustration with the manifold attempts by both local communities
and states to avoid desegregation is, perhaps, epitomized by Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964), where, when the case reached the Supreme Court, public schools had
been inoperative for more than five years. Confronted with situations like that in Prince
Edward County, it is no wonder that the Supreme Court ultimately had to ensure access
to the federal courts as quickly as possible.
131. In New York, a systematic effort is being made to make legal aid available to
welfare challengers. Law students, working through the Law Students' Civil Rights
Research Council (LSCRRC) are cooperating with attorneys who are handling welfare
cases.
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964) reads:
Any interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining the enforcement, operation
or execution of any State statute by restraining the action of any officer of such
State in the enforcement or execution of such statute or of an order made by an
administrative board or commission acting under State statutes, shall not be
granted by any district court or judge thereof upon the ground of the unconsti-
tutionality of such statute unless the application therefor is heard and determined
by a district court of three judges under section 2284 of this title.
Of course, the decision whether or not a three-judge court will be convened does not rest
with the plaintiff or the discretion of the court; its appropriateness depends entirely upon
the existence of the statutory conditions.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1964).
134. There are some federal district judges in the South who civil rights lawyers
feel cannot be relied upon for unbiased justice. In those districts, the addition of one judge
from the relatively good Fifth Circuit and of one other district judge will often turn a bad
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because at least one circuit judge must sit on the court.
135 Finally, the decision
of a three-judge court, even if not reviewed by the Supreme Court, is likely
to be accorded greater weight than the holding of a single district judge.
1. Availability of Three-Judge Court to Review Welfare Regulations.
There is some doubt whether a three-judge court can be convened when the
constitutional attack is focused upon the state administrative regulations, but
not upon the enabling statute. The question was apparently answered decisively
in the affirmative by the Supreme Court's decision in Oklahoma Gas Co. v.
Russell. 36 In that case it was argued that although section 266 of the Judicial
Code (the predecessor of section 2281) required a three-judge court for
issuance of injunctions against "enforcement . . . of an order made by an
administrative board," such a court was needed only when the injunction
was based upon the "unconstitutionality of such [authorizing] statute .... 137
The Court flatly rejected this construction and held that the statutory court
was necessary despite the plaintiff's failure to attack any state statute. As the
Supreme Court recognized, the legislative intention of the section was to
prevent a single judge from interfering with state pronouncements which are
of binding effect and general application. 3 8 Since welfare regulations clearly
fit this description, constitutional challenges to their validity are precisely the
type of action to which the statute is addressed.' 3 9
Nevertheless, in Sweeney v. State Board of Public Assistance,'
4° the only
welfare case in which this question has been raised, the court reached a con-
trary result. The plaintiffs sought an injunction in federal district court against
enforcement of a regulation of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Assis-
tance on the ground that it violated the fourteenth amendment. The court
held that to invoke a three-judge court would be improper when the constitu-
tionality of the regulation, but not of the statute pursuant to which it was
promulgated, was put into question. The Court did not mention Oklahoma
Gas Co. v. Russell. Instead, it relied upon Ex Parte Bransford,1
4 1 a case in
which the Supreme Court, ignoring Oklahoma, had held that a three-judge
court was not necessary to hear a constitutional challenge to an individual
court into an excellent, three-judge court. See generally L. Friedman, The Federal Courts
of the South: Judge Bryan Simpson and His Reluctant Brethren, in SOUTHERN JUSTICE
187 (Friedman ed. 1963).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 2284(1) (1964).
136. 261 U.S. 290 (1923).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
138. See AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 592 (1946).
139. In AFL v. Watson, the Supreme Court stated: "In our view the word 'statute'
in § 266 [now 28 U.S.C. § 2281] is a compendious summary of various enactments, by
whatever method they may be adopted, to which a State gives her sanction and is at least
sufficiently inclusive to embrace constitutional provisions." 327 U.S. 582, 592-93 (1946).
Of course, Watson stands only for the proposition that state constitutional provisions are
covered by § 2281. However, in the light of Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Russell, the dictum may
be read to cover regulations of general applicability.
140. 36 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 119 F2d 1023 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 611 (1941).
141. 310 U.S. 354 (1940).
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tax assessment when the statute itself was not impugned. The authority was
not on point. Tax assessments had previously been held by the Supreme
Court to lack the general binding applicability necessary to bring them within
the ambit of section 2281.142 Furthermore, factual determinations such as the
fixing of individual rates and taxes have generally not been considered
"orders" within the meaning of this statute.143
A recent district court decision in McWood Corp. v. State Corporation
Commission'44 may serve to clarify the circumstances under which a three-
judge court must be convened to determine the constitutionality of administra-
tive regulations. The issue in that case was whether section 2281 applied
in a suit to enjoin the state commission's cease-and-desist order directed to
the plaintiff; the validity of the statute authorizing the commission's conduct
was not in issue. The court was clearly troubled by the potential inconsistency
between the Oklahoma and Bransford decisions and held section 2281 in-
applicable on narrow grounds rather than under a broad rule requiring, in all
cases, a constitutional attack upon a statute. Thus, the court stated that "an
agency determination which is primarily a finding of fact ' 145 does not fall
within the statute; rather the "complainant must seek to forestall the demands
of some general state policy."' 46 Clearly the welfare claimant's section 1983
suit satisfies both of these criteria. Welfare regulations are neither factual
determinations nor individual exclusions from aid. On the contrary, they
embody the state-wide policy of the welfare commission, whose authority
derives from the most unspecific of enabling statutes.
147
2. Scope of the Court's Jurisdiction. If a statutory three-judge court is
convened to determine the constitutionality of the welfare regulation, will it
also consider challenges to the regulation which are based on a federal statute,
a federal regulation, or a state statute? In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Jacobsen,148 the Supreme Court held that the assertion of non-constitu-
tional claims in conjunction with a nonfrivolous constitutional attack did not
142. Ex parte Williams, 277 U.S. 267 (1928).
143. See id. See also Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding a
three-judge court unnecessary where the administrative action is a particularized finding
of fact).
144. 237 F. Supp. 963 (D.N.M. 1965).
145. Id. at 965.
146. Id. See also Phillips v. United States, 312 U.S. 246 (1941).
147. Assuming a non-frivolous claim by the plaintiff that a state regulation or statute
does violate the United States Constitution, the only factor which might make unnecessary
the convening of a three-judge court would be that "prior decisions make frivolous any
claim that a state statute on its face is not unconstitutional." See, e.g., Bailey v. Patterson,
369 U.S. 31, 33 (1962) (question presented was whether a state, by statute, could require
the use of segregated facilities in interstate commerce) ; Turner v. City of Memphis, 369
U.S. 350 (1962) (same). This principle, however, assumes, first, that the Supreme Court
has ruled on the question presented and, second, that the particular state statute in question
on its face violates precisely the principle decided by the Court. Clearly, absent a wholly
obvious attempt to bar Negroes from partaking of welfare benefits, the welfare regulations
do not yet present such patent unconstitutionality.
148. 362 U.S. 73 (1960).
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remove the case from the operation of section 2281, and that the three-judge
court could adjudicate all the claims. In the recent case of Hobson v.
Hansen,149 however, Chief Judge Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit
limited the broad language of the Florida Lime opinion. Where the various
counts in a complaint arise from different actions of the defendants and in-
volve essentially different factual questions, a three-judge court may hear
only those claims which in fact raise constitutional issues. 50 Those non-con-
stitutional claims which are not intimately related to claims properly encom-
passed by section 2281 must be adjudicated separately by a single-judge court.
Most challenges to welfare regulations will clearly be ruled by Florida
Lime. Usually it will be claimed that a certain regulation violates both the
Constitution and the federal statute or HEW rules. However, there may
be cases where a particular part of a regulation-the no-supplementation
provision of an employable mother rule, for example 1 - will be challenged
as unconstitutional, while another practice-such as refusal of an official to
accept applications-will be alleged to contravene the federal statute.152 In
such a case the distinct legal and factual nature of the claims, though not
barring joinder under rule 18(a) of the federal rules, might, under Hobson,
prevent the three-judge court from hearing the purely statutory claim.
V. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO STATE WELFARE PRACTICES
Section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivations not only of rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, but also of "any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the ... laws" of the United States.'l  A welfare claimant
might, then, bring an action against responsible state officials alleging that a
regulation or prevalent administrative practice contravened the Social Security
Act or mandatory federal regulations. The problems of abstention and ex-
haustion will, with minor exceptions, 154 be the same as those confronting
149. 256 F. Supp. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
150. Id. at 20.
151. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
152. Clearly, such a joinder of claims would be permissible under FED. R. Civ. P.
18(a). The statutory provisions involved are 42 U.S.C. §§ 302 (a) (9), 602(a) (9),
120 2 (a) (9), 1352(a) (9) (1964).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1983(1964).
154. To the extent that the reasoning behind a relaxed exhaustion doctrine for school
desegregation cases is applicable to the welfare situation, the case for relaxing exhaustion
requirements for the claimant alleging simply a statutory violation may be somewhat
weaker than the case when a substantial constitutional question is present. Presumably, if
Congress creates the right, Congress may limit, expressly or by implication, enforcement
of the right by conditioning it upon following a prescribed procedure, whether judicial or
administrative. Thus, Congress may, in some cases, explicitly provide that a complex
system of administrative remedies be followed. In the welfare situation, the only inference
of this nature arises from the fact that Congress apparently left the question of process of
review primarily to the states. When substantial constitutional rights are asserted, how-
ever, which are of such a nature that delay causes irreparable injury, the McNeese
doctrine would presumably apply. Some welfare cases fit his mold. The claimant is forced
to choose between loss of a right which is inherently non-compensable (submission to
illegal search and seizure) and loss of livelihood. However, if the nature of the relaxed
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the plaintiff who asserts a constitutional claim. However, there are additional
difficulties in bringing an action based upon a federal statute or regulation.
The claimant must establish that the Social Security Act or HEW regula-
tions bestow "rights, privileges, or immunities" upon persons seeking welfare.
And even assuming that a right exists within the meaning of section 1983,
there may be no basis for the jurisdiction of the district court, since the
scope of the jurisdictional companion statute to section 1983, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3), is arguably not co-extensive with the latter section.
A. Rights, Privileges, and Immunities
The Social Security Act does not confer upon anyone the "right" to
welfare. No state is obligated to participate in the federal program or to pro-
vide state aid of any kind.155 The act can, however, be deemed to create a
right of a less absolute nature: the right, in any state which has elected to
benefit from the federal program, to be considered for public assistance in
accordance with the criteria, and subject to the safeguards, required by the
act. Courts have been zealous in protecting such rights, even when attached
to the receipt of "benefits" or "gratuities."'1 6 The welfare claimant in a sec-
tion 1983 action seeks only the same protection. He asserts no unqualified
right to a welfare check, but rather claims that he is entitled to have his claim
considered in a manner which conforms to all statutorily mandated criteria
and safeguards. The "rights, privileges, and immunities" language of section
1983 is deliberately broad, and a properly expansive construction would
include the right to treatment by state welfare officials consistent with the
federal statute.
In determining whether a challenged state practice is inconsistent with
the federal statute, a court should look to federal, pdministrative rulings, even
if no violation of a specific provision of the Social Security Act is apparent.
An HEW rule represents a statutory interpretation by the federal agency
specifically authorized by Congress to promulgate regulations to define and
McNeese doctrine arises from the nature of and ex:perience with local school boards and
the pressing urgency of the injury, then the welfare cases would fit the mold whether or
not the violation alleged is of a constitutional dimension.
155. See notes 10, 12 supra.
156. Thus, in Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1965), no claim was made
that the plaintiffs' tobacco should necessarily be treated in a certain way for purposes of
allotments, but only that they had a right to a decision made by the Secretary of Agri-
culture in conformity with the statutory requirements. Similarly, in Gonzalez v. Freeman,
334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964), no right was asserted to contract with the Government,
but only to be accorded procedural fairness in the process of selecting government con-
tractors. Nor in Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958), was any right to an honorable
discharge alleged. Nevertheless, the use of impermissible criteria by the Secretary of the
Army in determining whether a discharge should be honorable was held enough, even il
this sensitive area of national defense, to justify interference by a court.
157. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications; -inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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effectuate the statutory goals. As such, it is entitled to the same presumption
of correctness 15 7 and force of law'5 s as is any other administrative action.
B. Jurisdiction of the District Court
Assuming that the welfare claimant has a cause of action under section
1983 based on the state's violation of the federal statute or regulations, he
must further establish the jurisdiction of the district court. His problem is
to bring the suit within a jurisdictional statute which does not require the
amount in controversy of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Individual welfare claims, how-
ever computed, 59 will rarely exceed $10,000. And it is unlikely that the
plaintiffs in a class action would be permitted to aggregate their claims. Under
the previous version of rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, aggre-
gation was allowed only in a "true" 160 class action, not in a "hybrid"1 6' or
"spurious '1 62 class action,1 6 3 and a suit by welfare claimants would un-
doubtedly have fallen within one of the latter categories. 6 4 This result does
not seem to have been altered by the recently amended version of rule 23,' 65
for the rationale upon which aggregation has traditionally been denied-the
severability of the individual claims-is apparently unaffected by the other-
wise substantial changes in rule 23.
If jurisdiction can be obtained under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3),16( however,
there is no requirement of an amount in controversy. 6 7 The language of this
158. See, e.g., United States v. Mersky, 361 U.S. 431 (1960) ; Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
159. Assuming one did want to determine the amount in controversy when dealing
with a welfare claim, the computation would be difficult. There is no adequate way of
determining for what length of time a given individual would remain eligible for payments
since eligibility may legitimately depend upon factors likely to change at any time-from
the health of the recipient to the general economic prosperity of a geographical area.
160. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1), 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
161. FED. R. Civ.-P. 23a) (2), 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
162. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3), 308 U.S. 689 (1939)..
163. See, e.g., Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Fuller v. Volk, 351
F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965) (treating the law as well settled that aggregation is allowed only
in true class actions). But see Brotherhood of RR Trainmen v. Templeton, 181 .F2d 527
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 823 (1950) (allowing aggregation in a spurious class
action).
164. The rights of the welfare claimants would be "several."
165. Welfare class actions would fall under new rule 23(b) (2):
The party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole....
166. The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress
providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States. ...
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
167. "As we held in Hague v. C.I.O ... the district courts of the United States are
given jurisdiction by 28 U.S.C. § 41(14) [now 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964) ] over suits brought
19671
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section is parallel to that of section 1983 with one major exception.'1 8 While
section 1983 creates a cause of action for deprivation of rights secured by all
"laws" of the United States, section 1343(3) gives the district courts juris-
diction of suits to redress only deprivations of rights secured by laws "provid-
ing for equal rights." (Emphasis added.) Since the Social Security Act is
hardly a law providing for equal rights, the district court would appear to
be without jurisdiction of statutory welfare claims under section 1983.
In most section 1983 cases, however, the dilemma created by the dis-
crepancy in language can be avoided by finding other sources of federal
jurisdiction.' 69 Even if the requisite amount in controversy under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 is not present, the district court may have jurisdiction on the ground
that the right infringed is guaranteed by an act which regulates commerce'70
or by a statute providing for internal revenue. 171 The public assistance
statutes, however, are certainly not acts regulating commerce. Nor are they
revenue acts; while sections of the Social Security Act relating to social
security insurance have been upheld under the power of Congress to provide
for internal revenue, the welfare provisions were not at issue in those deci-
sions.1 72 Federal jurisdiction of non-constitutional challenges to welfare regu-
lations, then, will depend upon the construction of section 1343(3).
The reason for the variance in language between the two statutes is not
clear. In the Revised Statutes of 1875, section 1979-the precursor of section
1983-and section 563(12)-the provision for civil rights jurisdiction in the
district courts-were identical in scope. Section 563(12) contained no lan-
guage limiting the word "laws" to those providing for equal rights. However,
the provision which gave the circuit courts of that time original jurisdiction
of civil rights suits, section 629(16), did restrict the scope of the grant to
actions for deprivations of rights under "laws providing for equal rights.' 173
under the Civil Rights Act [42 U.S.C. § 1983] without the allegation or proof of any
jurisdictional amount." Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 161 (1943).
168. There is a second minor difference in language in that § 1343(3) appears to
apply by its language only to deprivation under color of state authority, while § 1983
applies to that of states and territories.
169. A vast number of cases fall under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964)
providing for jurisdiction in cases arising under acts of Congress regulating commerce.
The issue of whether the difference in language would ever preclude jurisdiction when such
an alternative source is not present is explicitly recognized as undecided. See Pugach v.
Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). In Pugach,
the issue was whether a federal court had jurisdiction to enjoin a state court prosecutor
from using evidence obtained through a violation of the Federal Communications Act.
Since the federal statute involved is one regulating commerce, the problem of whether
jurisdiction would have been present under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964), since the act
does not provide for equal rights, did not have to be decided.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964) ; see Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 458 (1961).
171. 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1964).
172. See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
173. REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. J 1983 (1964), is derived from the third
Civil Rights Act of the Reconstruction period-1871. The jurisdictional sections are bf
earlier origins and appear to have been intended to establish jurisdiction for the 1866
[Vol. 67:84
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In the 1910 revision of the Judiciary Code, the two jurisdictional provisions
were merged, original jurisdiction remaining only in the district courts. 1 74
The new section retained the limitation found in the previous circuit court
provision. No satisfactory explanation can be given for the retention of this
qualifying phrase; it may well have been merely a drafting oversight during
a major revision and codification. Certainly there is no evidence that Congress
intended to diminish the prior jurisdiction of the district court. Indeed, some
of the brief legislative history suggests precisely the contrary-that the sole
purpose was to remove any original civil rights jurisdiction from the circuit
courts and to vest in the district court whatever jurisdiction had previously
existed in the two courts.1
7 5
The difference in language caused no immediate concern, for some courts
were interpreting section 1983 so narrowly that many deprivations of con-
stitutional rights were held not to give rise to a cause of action.17 However,
in 1947, the issue of the scope of the district court's jurisdiction over statutory
claims under section 1983 was raised before the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Bomar v. Keyes.177 Judge Learned Hand held that the
court had jurisdiction of a suit by a substitute teacher against school officials
who had fired her, allegedly because she had been absent for four days on
federal jury duty. No constitutional right to jury duty had been asserted.'
78
Rather, the decision rested on the ground that the federal jury statute created
a "privilege" which was subject to the protection of section 1983.179 Although
the federal statute was clearly not a law providing for equal rights, Judge
civil rights statutes. Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HA~v. L. REv.
1285, 1291-93 (1953).
174. S. REP. No. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 15 (1910).
175. "This paragraph [paragraph 14 of § 24 of title II of the Senate Bill] merges
the jurisdiction now vested in the district courts by paragraph 12 of section 563, and in
the circuit courts by paragraph 16 of section 629, and vests it in the district courts." Id.
176. Some courts seemed to be saying that § 1983 was available only for denials of
due process, and not for deprivations of equal protection. See, e.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216
F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954) (alternative holding), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955);
McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.2d 1016, 1018 n.2 (6th Cir. 1949) (dictum). Other courts
were giving a very narrow interpretation to the phrase "under color of . . .law." See,
e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) ; Stift v.
Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284, 286 (7th Cir.
1953). See generally Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, 49 CALIF. L. REv.
145 (1961) ; Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, supra note 173; Note,
Section 1983: A Civil Remedy for the Protection of Federal Rights, 39 N.Y.U.L.RIv.
839 (1964).
177. 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947) ; see Note, The Proper
Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, supra note 173, at 1291-93.
178. The distinction must be made between the constitutional right to be tried by a
jury from which no class has been discriminatorily excluded [e.g., Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940)] and the "right!' or "privilege"
to be on a jury. Whether this latter is, in fact, a right, is open to doubt, but several recent
cases have held that purposeful discrimination against persons in keeping them from jury
duty is a violation of their "rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
87 S. Ct. 92 (1966) ; White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (per curiam);
Mitchell v. Johnson, 250 F. Supp. 117 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
179. 162 F.2d at 139.
1967]
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Hand apparently did not perceive a potential obstacle to jurisdiction in the
limiting language of section 1343(3). Indeed, section 1343(3) was not even
mentioned in the opinion, and it has therefore been suggested that le may
have been proceeding on the assumption that section 1983 itself conferred
jurisdiction on the district court.'80 Alternatively, Judge Hand may have
proceeded on the assumption that jurisdiction under 1343(3) was coexten-
sive with the cause of action created by section 1983 despite the slight differ-
ence in language. Supreme Court decisions had apparently laid down the
broad rule that section 1343(3) conferred jurisdiction over all suits properly
brought under section 1983 irrespective of the amount in controversy,,' Since
those cases had involved constitutional rather than statutory claims, however,
the difference between the language of the two sections was irrelevant.
The result in Bontar is defensible, 8 2 even though it is difficult to justify
under rigid notions of statutory construction. Under a contrary interpretation,
a plaintiff with a valid non-constitutional cause of action under section 1983
would be barred from obtaining federal relief. Yet, the purpose of section
1983 is to provide a federal judicial remedy for deprivations of rights under
color of state law, regardless of the existence of a state judicial remedy.1i
s A
narrow construction of the jurisdictional statute would defeat the congres-
sional purpose to create a cause of action which need not be brought in the
state courts.
The welfare claimant's suit, in any event, should rarely raise this ques-
tion under section 1343(3). In most instances, statutory arguments will not
be presented alone. The same regulation will be challenged on both constitu-
180. See Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, supra note 173, at 1292.
See also Comment, The Civil Rights Acts and Mr. Monroe, supra note 176, at 148-51.
Indeed, such a conclusion is fortified by his identification of the issue as "whether the
district court had jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act." 162 F.2d at 138 (emphasis
added).
181. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
182. The argument is powerful that the Reconstruction Congress intended simply to
establish jurisdiction in the federal courts whenever there was a cause of action under the
civil rights statutes. "This responsibility [to shape American federalism] forbids winking
away the plain nationalizing purposes of the Reconstruction legislation, even on the firm
conviction-which the Supreme Court has sometimes not quite managed to conceal-that
bad Tad Stevens and his rads were a bit of a transient aberration not to be taken
seriously." A. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial,
113 U. PA. L. Rav. 793, 830 (1965). This effect could be given to the jurisdictional statute
by simply stating that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the statute providing for equal rights, par
excellence, and that whenever a cause of action exists under that statute, there is a
deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution (amend. XIV),
and by a law providing for equal rights (§ 1983). This question has been adjudicated in a
somewhat different guise. In New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 977 (1965), the Second Circuit decided that for purposes of the removal statute
[28 U.S.C. § 1443(2) (1964)] § 1983 was not a statute providing for equal rights. This
decision was forcefully opposed in the dissent by Judge Marshall: "The mere fact that
§ 1983 is 'coextensive with the whole reach of the Constitution' does not preclude the
possibility that it is a 'law providing for equal rights,' and much less that it could have
been viewed as such by the 1875 legislators and revisers." 342 F.2d at 281 n.7. The
position of the majority is given trenchant criticism in A. Amsterdam, snpra at 864-74.
183. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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tional and statutory grounds; under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, ad-
judication of the statutory claim will clearly be within the power of the
court. 84 The mere fact that the constitutional claim fails on the merits will
not destroy pendent jurisdiction of the statutory claim, 8 5 for only if the con-
stitutional claim is frivolous will the court refuse to hear the statutory claim
without an independent source of jurisdiction.
86
VI. SMITH v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS: INITIAL JUDICIAL RESISTANCE
Smith v. Board of Commissioners'8" is the only action by welfare claim-
ants under section 1983 which has reached "final adjudication in the federal
courts. Unfortunately, the hostile and peremptory treatment accorded the
claim in that case may also be adopted by other federal judges confronted
with so unfamiliar a suit. The brief opinion provides a panorama of the objec-
tions which will be aligned against the welfare claimant; however, close
examination of the court's grounds for dismissal reveals each to be untenable.
Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from alleged unconstitutional
investigatory practices-including midnight searches-mothers of children
receiving assistance brought a~n action under section 1983 against the Board
of Commissioners of the District of Columbia, the responsible welfare officials,
and several named investigators. On defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, District Judge Holtzoff dismissed the complaint. The court apparently
based its decision on five alternative grounds. The first was that the district
court had no jurisdiction over any suit dealing with the "internal administra-
tion of this agency or any other government department."'188 Entirely over-
looked was the basic consideration that when officers of a government agency
engage in searches, snooping, and surveillance of an individual, their actions
cease to be "internal administration" and must be measured against constitu-
tional standards.
The court's next postulate was that an agency disbursing grants and
"gratuities" such as welfare has absolute discretion, precluding any judicial
review.180 For the assertion of this immutable truth, no citation to authority
from statute or case law was deemed necessary. Yet, neither the legislative
history of the Social Security Act nor the decisions of many state courts
184. See generally Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Juris-
diction in the Federal Courts, 62 CoLum. L. REv. 1018 (1962). If the federal court will not
assume original jurisdiction over the welfare claim under § 1343(3), assuming the claim
to present a cause of action, it would become a valid state claim, and the state courts
would be required to enforce the federal right. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947);
Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1911).
185. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
186. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933).
187. 259 F. Supp. 423 (D.D.C. 1966).
188. Id. at 424.
189. The problem of discretion, as it relates to the discretion of the federal adminis-
trator, is treated in detail at notes 236-43 infra and accompanying text.
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during the thirty years of categorical assistance support such a view. Far
from being a generally accepted principle, the principle of non-reviewability
in such circumstances is disfavored; even where Congress has seen fit to pre-
clude review by the most direct command, the courts have still recognized
that the agency's discretion, although broad, is not absolute and may be sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny.190 The Supreme Court has said that "generally,
judicial review is available to one who has been injured by an act of a govern-
ment official which is in excess of his express or implied powers."' 01 The
district court in Smith identified no factor in this case which would remove
it from the operation of such a presumption.
The third point is particularly inapposite. Citing Massachusetts v.
Mellon,19 2 the court stated that an individual cannot "maintain an action to
enjoin the day-to-day administration of government functions or the use of
government funds."'19 Even assuming some validity to this rule of law as
stated, it bears no perceivable relevance to the Smith case. Frothingham v.
Mellon'9 dealt with an individual's standing to challenge government expen-
ditures by what amounted to a taxpayer's suit; in Smith the plaintiffs' posture
was not that of taxpayers, but of persons who had suffered particular depriva-
tions of rights by focused government action.' 95
The court further held that the injunctive relief requested against the
defendants, their agents and successors and all persons acting in concert with
them, restraining them from entering the dwellings of plaintiffs and others
so situated without a search warrant or the freely given consent of the occu-
pant, could not be granted because equity acts "in personam" and will not
enjoin large numbers of unnamed defendants. However, that principle can
hardly support the court's judgment in its entirety. At least two investigators
were named as defendants, and this reasoning could not have led the court
to deny the requested relief as to the agencies and the named investigators.
Finally, the decision rests on the plaintiffs' failure to complain of the
excesses of the particular investigators to their superiors-that they failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies. However, this conclusion ignores the
direct allegation in the complaint that the investigators acted "in concert and
participation with, under the orders, direction, control and supervision of,
190. See, e.g., Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958); Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114 (1946). While Estep involved a defense to a criminal prosecution, Harmon
was a petition for review. Review was granted despite the fact that the decision of the
Secretary of the Army was designated "final" by Congress.
191. Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581-82 (1958).
192. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
193. 259 F. Supp. at 424.
194. Apparently the court meant to refer to Frothingham, decided with Massachusetts
v. Mellon; the latter dealt only with the issue of state standing to challenge a federal
statute.
195. Plaintiffs' complaint in Smith was read into the Congressional Record by
Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. See 112 CONG. REc. 27335 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1966).
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and pursuant to practices and procedures established by defendants named
herein . ... "196 Since a ruling on a motion for summary judgment pursuant
to rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implies that there is no
"genuine issue as to any material fact," allegations of the plaintiffs must
be assumed true; yet the alleged state of facts would excuse the plaintiffs
from failing to exhaust administrative remedies which were clearly futile.
VII. JUDIcIAL REvIEw OF HEW CONFORMITY DECISIONS
The obligations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
under the categorical assistance titles of the Social Security Act97 are con-
fined to determining whether a state plan conforms to mandatory federal
requirements and approving or disapproving the subsequent denial of federal
funds. Although the act does not provide for periodic review of state pro-
grams or for the hearing of individual complaints, the Secretary must cut off
funds to an initially approved state program when violations of federal law
later come to his attention.198
Nevertheless, the only specific statutory provision for judicial review is
the one which permits a state dissatisfied with the Secretary's determination
of non-conformity to petition for review in a United States Court of Ap-
peals.IOD If a state plan is improperly approved by the Secretary, the state
would clearly have no reason to seek judicial review. Only those injured or
potentially injured by the failure of the Secretary to exact conformity with
federal law would be interested in having approval withheld or revoked. The
welfare claimant is aptly suited to perform this role; he will often desire to
proceed not only against the responsible state officials, but also against the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, particularly when a state plan
is riddled with abuses of many sorts. Indeed, in order to obtain effective relief
it may, in many instances, be necessary to join the federal administrator as
a defendant. For example, one defense available to the state agency will be
that the Secretary's approval of the plan indicates that the challenged regula-
tion is not inconsistent with federal requirements-an argument which may
have considerable weight if the regulation is of a type which exists in many
states. In this situation the only truly feasible or effective remedy would be
a judicial decree directed against the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.
The action for review of the Secretary's conformity finding would take
the form of a petition under section 10(b) of the Administrative Procedure
196. Id.
197. See notes 5-8 spra and accompanying text.
198. 42 US.C. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354 (1964). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. I,
1965).
199. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (3) (Supp. I, 1965).
19671
HeinOnline -- 67 Colum. L. Rev. 117 1967
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
Act20° alleging that portions of the approved state plan contravene the Con-
stitution, the Social Security Act, or HEW regulations. The relief sought
would be declaratory and injunctive. Since the Social Security Act contem-
plates a decision on conformity by the Secretary in the first instance,20 1 the
injunction probably would not take the form of a direct command to stop
payments to the state. Instead, the court would order him to exercise his
discretion and to initiate the procedures for a review of the conformity of the
plan.202 The problems inherent in such an action run the gamut of known
difficulties in securing judicial review of administrative action. In this con-
text, the major obstacles will involve the jurisdiction of the federal court,
the reviewability of the Secretary's decision, and the standing of the individual
welfare claimant.
A. Jurisdiction
1. Jurisdictional Statutes. As in suits against state officials under section
1983, the jurisdiction of the federal court must be established otherwise than
by proof of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount under section 1331.2 03 Aggre-
gation of the small claims of welfare plaintiffs in a class action will probably
not be permitted 2 0 4 Nor can it be successfully contended that the true amount
in controversy is not the pecuniary gain of the welfare claimant but rather
the full amount of federal payments to the state. Although the state's receipt
of this entire sum is jeopardized by the challenge to the conformity of the
state plan, the general rule has been that in suits for equitable relief the
amount in controversy is measured by the possible benefit to the plaintiff
and not the detriment to the defendant.20 5
One plausible source of federal jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. § 1340, which
grants the district courts jurisdiction of cases arising under acts of Congress
providing for internal revenue, without regard to amount in controversy. If
200. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(b) (1964):
(b) The form of proceeding for judicial review shall be any special statutory
review proceeding relevant to the subject matter in any court specified by statute,
or, in the absence or inadequacy thereof, any applicable form of legal action
(including actions for declaratory judgments or writs of prohibitory or manda-
tory injunction or habeas corpus) in any court of competent jurisdiction ...
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (Supp. 1, 1965).
202. The practical effect of such an order might well be the same as a direct order
from the court as to the illegality of the Secretary's approval. Since the Secretary need
not hold a hearing unless there are probable grounds for nonconformity, a direction by a
court to hold such a hearing is, in effect, a finding of probable cause for nonconformity.
203. Since 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) refers only to deprivations of rights under color of
state law, it could not be used as a source of jurisdiction for an action against a federal
administrator-with the possible exception of federal administrators of the District of
Columbia.
204. See notes 159-65 supra and accompanying text.
205. See 1 J. Mooaz, FEDERAL PRACTICE 827 (2d ed. 1964). The problem of "inclu-
sion," that is, what interests are to be considered in arriving at the amount in controversy,
is treated in Note, Federal Jiorisdictional Amount: Determination of the Matter in
Controversy, 73 H.Av. L. Rxv. 1369 (1960). It is suggested therein that courts often
assert jurisdiction when no interest at issue has an obvious dollar value, if it is likely that
at least one interest can legitimately be valued in excess of the minimum. Id. at 1375.
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a statute has been upheld under the powers of Congress to tax, presumably a
strong argument for jurisdiction under section 1340 can be made. When
the constitutionality of the insurance tax provisions of title IX of the Social
Security Act was attacked, they were upheld under the power of Congress
to tax.20 6 In the same case, however, the Supreme Court specifically avoided
ruling on a challenge to the unemployment compensation provisions of title
III, a program which has a structure nearly identical to that of the public
assistance sections.20 7 Thus, it appears unlikely that section 1340 may be
interpreted so broadly as to confer jurisdiction whenever a case arises under
an act which merely authorizes appropriations without levying a specific
tax-the Court's characterization of title III.
20
Jurisdiction of some actions by welfare claimants against the Secretary
may be afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which gives the district courts juris-
diction of "any action in the nature of mandamus to compel ... any [federal]
agency... to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff."2 9 The welfare claimant's
suit can be regarded as an action in the nature of mandamus if it is charac-
terized as an attempt to compel the Secretary's exercise of his discretion to
determine whether a state plan conforms to federal law.2 10 But the suit can
alternatively be characterized as a petition to review a prior finding of con-
formity as an abuse of discretion, in which event section 1361 is inapplicable.
Moreover, the court's jurisdiction under section 1361 depends upon the allega-
tion of a "duty owed to the plaintiff" by the federal agency, a phrase which
has been narrowly construed by the courts to exclude review of any adminis-
trative action which has involved the exercise of discretion or judgment' 11
2. Jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. In view of the
improbability of establishing jurisdiction under any provision of title 28, the
welfare claimant may be relegated to reliance upon section 10 of the APA
itself.21 2 Whether this section confers jurisdiction is an open question and
has been recognized as such by the courts.21 3 Some of the cases which have
treated section 10 as creating jurisdiction seem to have confused the concepts
206. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
207. Id. at 598.
208. Id.
209. This recently enacted provision was intended merely to obviate the necessity for
bringing certain kinds of actions in the District of Columbia which had been the only
district court to have mandamus jurisdiction. S. RE. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1962).
210. Section 1361 was recently used to establish jurisdiction in an action to compel
the Secretary of Defense to change the dishonorable nature of a serviceman's discharge.
Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277 (1st Cir. 1965). The court held that, since the service-
man had been denied counsel at his court martial, it was an abuse of the Secretary's
discretion not to change the discharge classification resulting from the court martial.
211. See, e.g., Parrott v. Cary, 234 F. Supp. 572 (D. Colo. 1964) ; Switzerland Co. v.
Udall, 225 F. Supp. 812 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 914 (1965). But see Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 282 (1st Cir. 1965).
212. See notes 200-10 supra and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Empresa Hondurena De Vapores, S.A. v. McLeod, 300 F.2d 222, 227
n.5 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd sub nomn. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372
U.S. 10 (1963).
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of judicial power over the subject matter and the related but distinct issues
of standing and reviewability.214 The court in Freeman v. Brown, for exam-
ple, stated explicitly that "the District Court had jurisdiction to review the
action of the Secretary [of Agriculture] under the Administrative Procedure
Act. ' 215 However, jurisdiction over the subject matter in that suit was clearly
present-with or without the APA-for the suit arose under the Agriculture
Adjustment Act, an act regulating commerce within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1337.216 As in other decisions in which jurisdiction could have been found
elsewhere, the court did not identify the other source but rather based its
power to proceed squarely upon section 10 of the APA.
Other cases do not involve any readily identifiable source of jurisdiction
other than the APA217 In the recent case of Mulry v. Driver,218 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit seems squarely to have faced this issue and
to have decided that the APA confers, independent of any other statute, sub-
ject matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. The court stated that the district
court should have decided whether the action in question was authorized by
the APA, and that, if it was, "the necessary consent of the United States
will be found to exist."219
Only a few cases express a contrary view. Most outspoken among these
is Ove Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete 22 in which the court stated that
"neither [section 10(a)] nor any other clause of §10 extends the jurisdiction
of the federal courts to cases not otherwise within their competence. 221 How-
ever, this language does not represent a precise statement of the holding of
the case: that the APA did not excuse the bringing of an action in the district
court which was required by the Tucker Act2 2 to be brought in the Court
of Claims. Indeed, as the court noted, section 10(c) of the APA itself pre-
cludes a district court from taking jurisdiction when there is an adequate
214. E.g., Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955) ; Estrada v. Ahrens, 296
F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961). Although both courts spoke in terms of jurisdiction, the cases
arose under the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, which had a jurisdiction
conferring section. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1964). Therefore, the issue in these cases was not
whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction, but whether the particular issues
involved were non-reviewable, given the court's competence, under traditional adminis-
trative law concepts. Cf. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
215. 342 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir. 1965).
216. Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1937) (holding as to 28 U.S.C. § 41(8), tnow
28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1964)).
217. McEachern v. United States, 321 F.2d 31 (4th Cir. 1963) ; Adams v. Witmer,
271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1959).
218. 366 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1966).
219. Id. at 547.
220. 278 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960).
221. Id. at 914. See also Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). In Kansas City, the court observed, in
dictum, that § 10(b) did not confer upon the courts jurisdiction "over an action not
otherwise cognizable by them." 225 F.2d at 933.
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964). The provision has since been amended [see Supp. I,
1965], but the court in Ove was dealing with the earlier section which provided exclu-
sive relief in the Court of Claims for contract actions against the United States for over
$10,000.
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remedy available in another court.2 3 The significance of the court's dictum
concerning the APA is reduced as well by the court's alternative holding
that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the
disputes clause of the government contract
2 24
There are persuasive policy reasons for regarding section 10 as conferring
federal judicial jurisdiction. As Professor Jaffe has argued:
Cases have arisen where the sole basis of jurisdiction (other than
the APA) would appear to be the "federal question" jurisdiction
which requires a jurisdictional amount. It does seem inapt to make
it a condition of a suit against an officer that the right asserted be
given a value, if indeed in many cases it is even possible. This being
so it would seem sound to treat § 10 as a source of jurisdiction
with respect to any of the questions which that section makes review-
able, and some courts have so held.
225
The welfare claimant's suit falls precisely within this category of cases. Most
often it will be practically impossible to evaluate the plaintiff's interest, particu-
larly when the challenge is to an invalid condition upon the receipt of aid
which has not yet been cut off. Even if the claimant's pecuniary loss is deter-
mined to be less than $10,000, the exercise of federal judicial power should
not thereby be precluded. At stake is the very livelihood and perhaps survival
of the plaintiff. In such circumstances it is indeed "inapt" to require an amount
in controversy which-because it is virtually unattainable by welfare claim-
ants-would effectively insulate the Secretary's determinations from judicial
oversight.
B. Reviewability
Section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial
review of any final agency action "except so far as (1) statutes preclude
judicial review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion .... "226
1. Statutory Preclusion. No section of the Social Security Act explicitly
precludes judicial review of the Secretary's approval of a state welfare plan.
The act does, however, specifically provide for review of the administrator's
decisions under the federal social security insurance program227 and of the
Secretary's finding of non-conformity of a state plan. 2 It may be argued
that these provisions for the review of certain administrative decisions evince
an intent to limit judicial inquiry to the actions covered by those sections.
223. Section 10(c) of the APA reads: "Reviewable Acts-Every agency action
made reviewable by statute and every final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in any court shall be subject to judicial review ... " 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c)
(1964) (emphasis added).
224. 278 F.2d at 915.
225. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTIoN 165 (1965).
226. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1964).
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1316(a) (3) (Supp. I, 1965).
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The Supreme Court has employed reasoning of this sort in construing
another, unrelated statute in Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board:
When Congress . . . provided for judicial review of two types of
orders or awards and in . . . the same Act omitted any such provi-
sion as respects a third type, it drew a plain line of distinction.
221
However, the Switchmen's Union case cannot support general application of
an expressio unius analysis in this context. The Court's statement was merely
advanced to reinforce the conclusion that the legislative history showed a
congressional intent to prevent judicial interference.230 In this respect the
Social Security Act is clearly distinguishable, for there is no indication that
Congress intended to preclude review or even contemplated that such review
might be sought by welfare claimants.231 Nor is the provision for review of
individual complaints in the insurance program particularly persuasive under
the Switchmen's language. Indeed, this program-which is administered
directly by the federal government and is independent of any state participa-
tion-should realistically be viewed as a separate act for these purposes;
there is evidence that Congress' primary concern in establishing judicial re-
view was to forestall anticipated constitutional objections to the insurance
section of the statute. Finally, the approach taken by the Supreme Court in
Switchmen's Union has been severely criticized and rarely followed.23 2 The
more logical view, and one more consistent with the broad policy of the
Administrative Procedure Act is that "[t]he right to judicial review is a
basic protection. It is not too great a burden upon Congress to require it to
speak to the issue."' 33
Despite these criticisms, such expressio unius reasoning persists: its most
recent reaffirmation may be found in Paducah Junior College v. Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare.234 Pursuant to a state plan which had been
approved by HEW, the plaintiff sought and was denied a federal grant under
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. The district court dismissed the
suit, holding that Congress had precluded judicial review of such decisions
229. 320 U.S. 297, 306 (1943).
230. Id. at 302-03, 305.
231. The legislative history of the Social Security Act casts some light on the failure
to provide for review. In many respects welfare was viewed as an interim measure in
which federal participation would become unnecessary upon a resumption of normal
economic conditions: "Many of the children included in relief families present no other
problem than that of providing work for the breadwinner of the family." S. RiP. No.
628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935).
232. See L. JAFFr, supra note 225, at 357. See also 4 K. DAvis, ADmnNisTATiVE LAW
TREATISE § 28.09, at 42-44 (1958). Compare R. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and
Judicial Review, 65 COLum. L. REv. 55 (1965) (advocating a significant broadening of
judicial review for abuse of discretion), with 4 K. DAvis, ADMiNISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
(Supp. 1965, at 15-30). On the Switchmen's Union case itself, see H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTE 327 (1953).
233. L. JAFFE, supra note 225, at 373.
234. 255 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
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by the Commissioner of Education. The court found it particularly signifi-
cant2 5 that the act specifically provided for review in two instances-when
the Commissioner disapproved a state plan and when a federal loan was
denied to an individual institution-but was silent as to review of the agency's
refusal of grants. In view of the close parallels between the facts of Paducah
and those generally involved in welfare claims, the decision, if followed,
would appear to constitute a considerable barrier to judicial review of the
Secretary's determinations as to the conformity of state welfare programs.
However, the decision contradicts the weight of reasoned commentary in the
area and should succumb to persuasive arguments founded on the policy of
the APA and the pressing need for judicial surveillance of the administration
of the Social Security Act.
2. Committed by Law to Agency Discretion. The APA precludes
judicial review of agency action which is "by law committed to agency dis-
cretion.""" The Social Security Act does, of course, confer extensive discre-
tion upon the Secretary with regard to state welfare plans. He is empowered
to judge, in the first instance, whether a hearing is necessary and whether the
state plan does comply with the statute.2 7 The proper interpretation of the
discretionary exception in section 10 has been the subject of considerable
debate. 2 8 Opinion is unanimous, however, that not every case in which some
discretion is granted to the administrator is excluded by this provision. The
courts have recognized that there is a degree of discretion in every agency
action.
239
A useful distinction which has emerged in applying section 10 focuses
upon whether the statute under consideration characterizes the agency action
as permissive or mandatory.2 40 Thus, in Freeman v. Brown,241 the APA was
held to authorize review of a decision by the Secretary of Agriculture con-
cerning a classification of tobacco under the price support program. The court
concluded that the Secretary's wide discretion in making such classifications
was not unlimited and that judicial supervision was proper to compel him
to apply compulsory statutory criteria in his decisions. Similarly, the require-
ments of the Social Security Act-to which state plans must conform before
235. See id. at 150.
236. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1964).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. I, 1965). If the Secretary rules that the state plan does
not conform, the state may petition for a hearing which the Secretary must grant.
238. Compare R. Berger, supra note 232, with 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINIsTRATin LAW
TRaTISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965).
239. See, e.g., Homovich v. Chapman, 191 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
240. See, e.g., Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205, 212 (5th Cir. 1965). Of course, in
a larger context, the most important factors affecting reviewability will be the nature of
the injury done by the allegedly unlawful act of the agency. In this respect, as suggested
by Professor Davis, the scale runs from agency action which imposes definite obligations
to agency action which merely fails to give benefits. See 4 K. DAvis, ADMiN STRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 28.19, at 103. (1958).
241. 342 F.2d 205, 212-13 (5th Cir. 1965).
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they are approved-are mandatory, and the Secretary is specifically com-
manded to exact compliance with these criteria 2 42 To this extent, then, his
otherwise broad discretion is strictly curtailed.
The proper judicial attitude to reviewability should be that administrative
deviation from clear statutory limitations is an abuse of discretion which will
be subject to review unless there are countervailing social policies which
dictate against judicial supervision of the regulatory scheme.2 48 No such
overriding policy would insulate the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare from judicial review of his conformity findings. On the contrary,
review is necessary to assure the eradication of state practices which infringe
upon the Constitution or federal statutes-though they have escaped the
Secretary's attention.
C. Standing
A denial of standing to welfare claimants would render the Secretary's
finding in favor of a state plan effectively unreviewable, for no other party
would seek to challenge the determination. 244 Indeed, if the problems of juris-
diction and specific exclusion under section 10 are surpassed, reviewability
depends solely upon the standing of the plaintiff. Section 10(a) of the APA
reads:
Right of review-Any person suffering legal wrong because of any
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by such action
within the meaning of any relevant statute, shall be entitled to
judicial review thereof.2 45
It has been argued that the legislative history of this section warrants a broad
reading which would give standing to anyone actually injured by adminis-
trative action covered by the APA-that only the word "aggrieved" and not
the phrase "adversely affected" is modified by "within the meaning of any
relevant statute."2 46 However, most courts have rejected this construction and
have held that, in the absence of a "relevant statute," the plaintiff's standing
242. 42 U.S.C. §§ 304, 604, 1204, 1354 (1964).
243. It may be argued that at least part of the difficulty of the discretion problem
would be removed by looking behind the statutory language or rigid classification of the
nature of the claim against the administrator to the reason for the granting of whatever
degree of discretion is present. When the rationale for discretion is that the matters involved
are peculiarly outside of the sphere of judicial competence or are matters of internal ad-
ministration of government, the discretion should be accepted as final. See Duba v. Schuct-
zle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962). When, however, the interest of the government is not
exclusive and when the application of other established doctrines which would cause the
judicial branch to refrain from interfering is improper, the violation of the bounds of
administrative discretion in the form of the violation of statutory standards for the
exercise of discretion should be reviewable.
244. "For instance, when the party who challenges administrative action has better
standing than any other party, a holding that the challenging party lacks standing is the
equivalent of a holding of unreviewability ... " 3 K. DAvis, ADnMINISTRM rIv LAW
TREATISE § 22.01, at 208 (1958).
245. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1964).
246. 3 K. DAvis, ADmiNsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 22.02, at 211-13 (1958).
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must be tested by the "legal wrong" criterion.2 47 Since no "person aggrieved"
statute applies to the welfare claimant, his recourse to a federal court for
review of the Secretary's decision will hinge upon the meaning of this
standard.
1. Legal Wrongs and Legal Rights. Use of the phrase "legal wrong"
in section 10 incorporated the prior, non-statutory law of standing. The lead-
ing explication of this body of law was the Supreme Court decision in
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. 248 In that case, the Court denied steel producers
who sought to contract with the federal government standing to challenge
the validity of the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Public Contracts
Act of 1936.249 Standing derives only from governmental action which
threatens or invades a recognized legal right of the plaintiff; mere economic
loss cannot be the source of such rights. Thus, the steel producers lacked
standing, for they had no independent right to contract with the Government.
Nor did any legal rights vest in the plaintiffs by virtue of the statutory re-
quirement that the Secretary follow certain procedures and apply specified
criteria in contracting with private citizens. These restrictions were not for
the protection of the plaintiffs, and, in any event, they were merely non-bind-
ing, "self-imposed restraints" on the Government.250 The welfare claimant
does not have an absolute right to public assistance. But he does assert a right
to have the state consider his claim in accordance with constitutional and
statutory imperatives-a right which is clearly threatened or invaded by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare when he approves a state plan
which does not ensure such compliance. Nevertheless, Perkins implies that
private rights of this nature cannot accrue from the Government's "self-
imposed restraints" on the distribution of benefits. Subsequent cases have,
however, modified this aspect of the Perkins decision. In Gonzalez v. Free-
man,251 for example, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that-
while there may be no right to contract with the Government-there is a
"right" to require that administrative officials respect congressionally estab-
lished procedures in determining whether or not, and to whom, contracts
should be given. Although Perkins was distinguished on the grounds that the
plaintiff in Gonzalez had been cut off from an already existing contract,
252
the decision represents a substantial and sound qualification of the earlier
decision in Perkins.
Perkins rested upon a judicial perspective which has been, in great mea-
sure, altered in recent years. The emphasis of the opinion was upon the in-
247. See, e.g., Paducah Junior College v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
255 F. Supp. 147, 150 (W.D. Ky. 1966) (dictum).
248. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
249. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1964).
250. 310 U.S. at 127.
251. 334 F.2d 570, 574-75 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
252. See id. at 574.
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appropriateness of judicial interference with the type of administrative action
involved-the making of public contracts. Several spheres of government
activity have traditionally been viewed as areas in which judicial review
should be precluded or severely limited. 253 In some areas-foreign affairs
25 14
and military matters,25 5 for example-the reluctance persists today. But the
broad category of "bounties and privileges"--including government contracts
-which was often considered entitled to this "hands-off" treatment, no longer
retains its immunity from judicial review. 250 As the governmentally created
"privileges" have become increasingly numerous and important257 the rationale
underlying such insulation has become the subject of sharp criticism. Particu-
larly in view of section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act the general
presumption against review of government action concerning "privileges" can
no longer be supported.
258
2. Legislative Intent to Protect-An Emerging Criterion for Standing.
The public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act bear strong like-
nesses to a number of other social welfare programs-including Urban Re-
newal,259 "Medicaid," 260 Federal Aid to Education,201 and Public Housing.
202
These statutes have parallel forms of administration: a federal agency is
charged with distributing funds or other aid to state, local, or duly authorized
private bodies, and these non-federal bodies determine the specific allocation
of the funds, subject to broad conditions imposed by the federal statute and
enforced by the federal administrator. Cases arising under these programs
have raised the question whether an individual who is injured by the local
agency's non-compliance with federal standards may obtain judicial review of
the federal administrator's failure to enforce these standards. Although the
courts have yet to recognize that there are problems of standing peculiar to
this situation, some of the cases reveal a trend away from strict adherence to
the recognized "legal right" language of Perkins and toward the formulation
of a new test: whether the federal requirement violated by the state was one
which Congress imposed to benefit or protect a class of which the plaintiff
is a member.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been the leader in this
253. See L. JAFFj, supra note 225, at 363-71.
254. See Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 933 (1964).
255. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953). But see Harmon v.
Brucker, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
256. See, e.g., Freeman v. Brown, 342 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1965). The whole nature of
what constitutes a "privilege" is subject to considerable change today. See, e.g., D.
Westfall, Agricultural Allotments as Property, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1180 (1966).
257. See, e.g., Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2981(1964),
as amended (Supp. I, 1965).
258. See L. JAFFr, .supra note 225, at 369.
259. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1451 (1964).
260. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (Supp. I, 1965).
261. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-44 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1, 1965).
262. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1410-11 (1964), as amended (Supp. I, 1965).
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development. In the area of public housing the court unequivocally equated
the violation of a statutory provision intended to protect the plaintiffs' class
with the existence of a "legal wrong" under the APA. Thus, in Shanks Village
Committee v. Cary,263 340 tenants brought suit against the Public Housing
Administrator to enjoin enforcement of a 15%b rent increase, seeking an order
to compel him to comply with the requirement of the Lanham Act that rents
be within the financial reach of servicemen with families. 2 4 The court's find-
ing of standing was based upon the "right" of the veterans not to be evicted
from their apartments by the unlawful conduct of the federal administrator.
While the Shanks case may be distinguished from that of the welfare
claimant in that the plaintiffs were directly injured by acts of the federal
administrator without the intervention of a state agency, the Second Circuit's
urban renewal decisions, which evince a similar emphasis on legislative intent,
cannot be distinguished on that ground. In Gart v. Cole,26 5 residents of the
proposed Lincoln Center renewal site sued for injunctive relief against the
HHFA alleging infractions of the bidding procedures set forth in the federal
act, and a failure to comply with the statutory requirement of a public hearing
to challenge the city relocation plan. The court held that the plaintiffs did
have standing under the APA to challenge the failure to accord a hearing,
26 6
for that statutory procedure clearly was inserted for their benefit. But it ruled
that they could not challenge the bidding irregularities, since "these sections
seem designed to protect not the interests of landowners or tenants in a rede-
velopment area, but those of the public at large.
'267
Similar reasoning, focusing upon the existence of a congressional intent
to protect the plaintiffs, is found in Berry v. HHFA.20 8 In that case, hotel
owners sought to challenge an urban renewal project which provided for the
construction of transient housing units which would compete with the plain-
tiffs' business. They invoked a statutory command that no project include
such provisions unless the available transient housing in the community has
been surveyed and found inadequate. The court denied standing. Although
Perkins was cited, the decision rested primarily on the ground that the statu-
tory criterion was established not to protect the hotel owners but, rather, to
preserve the residential character of renewal projects and to ensure that the
limited federal funds are not wasted on unnecessary commercial hotels.
While courts other than the Second Circuit have occasionally indicated
that a congressional intent to protect the interests asserted by appellants will
confer standing upon them,2 69 most have failed to recognize its relevance to
263. 197 F.2d 212 (2d Cir. 1952).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 1571 (1964).
265. 263 F2d 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959).
266. Id. at 250.
267. Id.
268. 340 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1965).
269. See, e.g., Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965).
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standing under the "legal wrong" standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act.2 70 The approach of the Second Circuit, however, is sound and should
be extended. If those persons whom the statute and Constitution intended to
protect cannot challenge its violation, the administrative abuse is effectively
unreviewable.2 71 In Perkins itself the Supreme Court supported its holding
with the observation that Congress had not designated the disputed statutory
provision for the benefit of the plaintiffs. Moreover, in cases arising under
"persons aggrieved" statutes, the tendency has been to broaden the scope of
standing to include persons whose interests were intended to be served by
the statute and who have actually been injured by the action of the agency.
Thus, whereas courts traditionally denied standing unless economic injury-
such as that of a competitor-could be shown, 272 more recent cases have
granted standing to consumers, television audiences, and residents whose
interests were the raison d'Etre of the regulatory agency.27 3 Underlying this
trend is a growing recognition that, although agencies are created to protect
the public interest, they have not always done so, and their performance in
this regard would be aided by according some role in the administrative
process to responsible organs of public expression.m2 74 This lesson is fully
applicable to the administration of welfare; experience has shown that the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has not been able to prevent
infringement of the rights of individuals by state welfare programs.
Application of the "intent to protect" test to welfare proceedings should
result in the finding of standing in nearly all cases. Most suits by welfare
claimants will be based upon alleged violations of constitutional rights. Since
the Bill of Rights was certainly intended to protect the interests of individuals,
270. See, e.g., Rural Electrification Administration v. Central La. Elec. Co., 354 F.2d
859 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 87 S. Ct. 34 (1966). In that case, standing was denied to a
public utility to enjoin a loan by the REA to a competing co-op on a claim of violation of
a statute in making the loan. The violation was of a provision providing that no loans
should be made where there are already existing adequate central power provisions.
Accord, Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 915 (1963); Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. HHFA, 310 F.2d 99
(7th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) ; Caulfield v. United States Dep't of
Agriculture, 293 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. dismissed, 369 U.S. 858 (1962) ; Paducah
Junior College v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 255 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Ky.
1966).
271. See note 244 .nipra.
272. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
273. See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC,
354 F.2d 608, 615-17 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966). In the former
case, standing was granted to responsible groups representing Negro television viewers in
the Jackson, Mississippi area to challenge the conditional grant of a license to a station
which had been, allegedly, racist in its policies. For treatment of the general problem of
standing to viewers, consumers, etc., see Comment, Standing of Television Viewers to
Contest FCC Orders: The Private Action Goes Public, 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1511, 1512-20
(1966).
274. "Nor does the fact that the Commission itself is directed by Congress to protect
the public interest constitute adequate reason to preclude the listening public from assisting
in that task." Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
(Vol. 67:84
HeinOnline -- 67 Colum. L. Rev. 128 1967
REVIEW OF WELFARE PRACTICES
claimants should be accorded standing in these cases. Moreover, most of the
statutory provisions which welfare claimants allege have been violated are
designed to protect the individual claimant. Although the act vests consider-
able discretion in the states,2 75 the restrictions which it does impose were
meant to bind; the legislative history is unambiguous that both the states and
the Secretary were to treat them as absolutely mandatory: "These conditions
are entirely appropriate and are, in fact, essential if the Federal Government
is to bear a part of the burden." 27 That these mandatory conditions upon the
states' receipt of federal aid are intended to protect needy individuals is equally
clear from the legislative history. "[These conditions] do not involve dictation
by the Federal Government, but only establish standards which will make it
reasonably certain that the States are honestly trying to meet the problem
of the [welfare recipient] ."277 Indeed, the reports are replete with evidence
of congressional concern for the plight of needy individuals. 278 Even where
the legislative history is silent or inconclusive with respect to the purpose of
a particular statutory provision, the intent to protect individual claimants will
usually be clear on its face. Requirements such as a fair hearing, or the dis-
tribution of welfare information, are unquestionably imposed for the individ-
ual's benefit. Others, like the criteria governing the selection and tenure of
administrative personnel, are clearly unrelated to the direct interests of the
welfare recipient, but infractions of such requirements are not likely to be
challenged in court. Finally, the purpose of some provisions may be ambigu-
ous. For example, the act's insistence upon the uniform application of plans
throughout the state may reflect a congressional attempt to alleviate the ad-
ministrative burden of the Secretary, or it may be designed as a safeguard
against local discrimination; in the absence of definitive legislative history
neither interpretation can be entirely discounted. Where the legislative purpose
underlying the provision cannot be discovered, or where the requirement was
intended to .serve a dual function, the fact that a fundamental right of the
individual is secured by its operation should be deemed sufficient to give him
judicial standing to ensure that it is enforced.
275. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
276. S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1935).
277. Id. at 6. Actually, this statement was made with reference to the dependent
aged rather than the AFDC recipient. Indeed, most of the legislative history related
primarily to title II of the original bill, providing for a social security insurance system.
See E. WITTE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 93, 102-04 (1962). In
the area of public assistance, attention was focused on title I, providing for old-age
assistance, and its relation to title II in the context of a long-range program. See G.
STEINER, SOCIAL INSECURITY: THE POLITICS OF WELFARE 18-47 (1966) ; E. WIrrTE, supra
at 78-79. Nevertheless, since the structure of both the AFDC and the AB sections were
closely analogous to that of the OAA title, much of the history of title I is applicable to
these titles as well. The reports themselves are explicit about the interrelationship:
"These grants-in-aid are made under conditions very similar to the grants for old-age
assistance." S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935).
278. See H. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6, 10 (1935); S. REP. No. 628,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-19, 22 (1935).
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